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I.

INTRODUCTION: BuRMA, SouTH AFRICA

&

CoNSUMER SoVEREIGNlY

In june 2000, the Supreme Court held in Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council (NFTC) 1 that federal sanctions against Burma preempted the Massachusetts Burma law. With its "Burma Law," Massachusetts sought to replicate the anti-Apartheid boycott, one of the
most successful human rights campaigns in history. Massachusetts'
Burma law authorized state agencies to exercise a strong purchasing
preference in favor of companies that do not conduct business in
Burma unless the preference would irripair essential purchases or
result in inadequate competition. 2
In Crosby, the Court held that Congress preempted the Massachusetts Burma law when it adopted federal sanctions on Burma. While
the state law applied to purchasing by state agencies, the federal law
. imposed a limited range of sanctions, including a ban on future
private investment, and gave the President discretion regarding the
imposition of some of these sanctions. 3 However, the Court declined
to rule that the Massachusetts Burma law was unconstitutional
under the federal foreign affairs power or the dormant Commerce
Clause, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals had in National Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios. 4 The Crosby decision provides no fuel for a
constitutional claim, but neither does it blunt the impact of the First
Circuit's holding that the state law is unconstitutional. 5
As the First Circuit acknowledged, there are volumes of analysis,
pro and con, regarding the constitutional theories that the First
Circuit used to invalidate Massachusetts' Burma law in NFTC v.

1. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
2. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22 G-M (West 2000 Supp.).
3. 120 S. Ct. at 2289, 2302.
4. Id. at 2294 n.8. The lower court cases contain different names because the defendant
Massachusetts office holders changed. The federal trial court decision of Judge Joseph Tauro is
National Fureign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). Judge Tauro ruled
against Massachusetts on grounds of the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 291-92. The appeals
court decision ofJudge Sandra Lynch is National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1"
Cir. 1999). The First Circuit ruled against the Massachusetts Burma law on three separate
grounds. It first ruled that the law conflicted with the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 49-61.
The court also relied on the dormant Commerce Clause. /d. at 61-71. Finally, the court held that
the Massachusetts Burma law was preempted under federal law. /d. at 71-77.
5. Federal district courts have already cited Natsios as authority to support injunctions against
the Miami-Dade boycott of Cuba and a California insurance law that regulates insurance
companies with Holocaust-era policies. See Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp.
2d 1174 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Quackenbush, No. Civ. S-000506WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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Natsios. 6 Much of this scholarship argues that absent a clear conflict
or statement of congressional intent to preempt state or local law,
the federal foreign affairs power alone does not render a state or
local law unconstitutional. 7 With the extensive published work
on each side of the anti-Apartheid boycotts8 as well as the Burma
laws, 9 there is little need to revisit such well-plowed fields.

6. 181 F.3d at 58 n.13.
7. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149-65
(2d ed. 1996); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance ofFederalism to U.S.
Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position ,110 HAR.v.
L.REv. 815 ( 1997); Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & PoL'Y 405 (1997); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free
Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); A.M.
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Coses, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. (1995); Brenda
S. Beerman, Comment, State Involvement in the Promotion ofExport Trade: Is it Time to Rethink the
Concept ofFederalism as itPerlains to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 187 (1995).
For a perspective that stresses judicial deference to the Executive Branch more than Congress,
see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HAR.v. L. REv. 1824 (1998).
8. For articles defending state and local authority, see, e.g., lAtJRENCE TRmE, MEMoRANDUM ON THE
EfFEcr OF THE CoMPREHENSIVE AN'n-APARIHEID Acr OF 1986 UPON STATE AND LocAi..
MEAsuREs, 132 CoNG. REc. 23,292 (1986); Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in South Africa: 7he
Lifting ofthe Onnprehensiue AnD-ApartheidAa of1986 and the Continuing Validity ofState and l.ncolA'TIIMpartlu!id
Legislation. 6 CoNN.j.INr'L L 7 (1990); Kevin P. Lewis, Dt!almgwith South Africa: 7he Omstitmiuna/ity ofState
and Load Divestment Legislation. 61 TuL. L REv. 469 (1987); Andrea L McArdle, In Defense ofState and Locol
Government AnD-Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign~ 62 TEMP. L REv. 813
(1989); Anne R Bowden, Note, Nurth Carolina's South Africa Divestment Statute, 67 N.C. L REv. 949 (1989);

NONPREEMPllVE

Grace A Jubinsky, Note, State and Load GovemmenJ.s Rma Against South African Apr.atheid: An Assessment ofthe
ConstituJiona/j of the Divestment Campaign. 54 U. ON. L REv. 543 (1985); Michael Shuman, Dateline Main
StrPd: Courls v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FoR. POL'y 158 (1992).
For articles challenging state and local authority, see, e.g., John H. Chettle, The Law and Policy
ofDivestment of South African Stock, 15l.Aw & PoL'Y lNT'L Bus. 445 (1983); Howard N. Fenton, III,
The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563 (1993); Peter Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South African Action as an
Intrusion Upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813 ( 1986).
9. Symposium, States'Rightsvs. Int£mational Trade: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 19 N.Y.L Sa-I.j.ll'o'T'I.
& CoMP. L 347 (2000). For articles defending state and local authority, see, e.g., Steven R Jenkins, National
Foreign Trade Council v. 7he Communwea/Jh ofMassachusetts: A StateAainga.s a "Market Participant" Should Trump
the Fedeml Government's Right to Regulate Foreign Affairs Unless Congress Expressly Declares Otherwise, 14 CoNN.
j.INr'L L 593 (1999); Douglas W. Kmiec, May States Expr-ess Their Moral Standards by OwosingtheNatiuns with
lWiich They Trader, 6 PREviEw U.S. SUP. Cr. CAs. 298 (2000); Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson,
M.assachusetl.s Owi1enges the Bumzese Dictators: 7he OmstitutiunaJit of&lective Pu:rchasing Laws, 39 SANTA OARA
L REv. 373 ( 1999); Matthew C. Porterfield, rupronote 7; Lily Batchelder, Note, The Costs ofUniformity: Fedeml
Foreign~ State Sovereignty, and the Massachusetts BU1TIUl Law, 18 YAu: L & PoL'y REv. 485 (2000);
AhgandraCan'ahal, Note, State and Load "FneBurma" Laws: 7heCaseforSuh-NationalTradeSanctions, 291Aw
& PoL'viNT'I. Bus. 257 (1998);Jay A Christoffen;on, Comment, 7he OmstiJmiunality ofState Laws Prohibiting
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Instead, this Article seeks to derive some guidance from the Crosby
decision for state and local legislatures, as many of these bodies want to
play more than the very limited role that the Court, during oral
argument, suggested was appropriate. Justice Souter, who wrote the
Crosby opinion, suggested that states should be satisfied with simply
expressing their views:
[Perhaps] the proper way to draw the line is to allow States to
express themselves, to express their views ... so long as they do
not go beyond the point of verbalizing ... [condemnation of]
the regime in Burma and, indeed, ... those who do business
with it, but it would be left to the United States to go beyond the
expression of views and to regulate actual relationships, including economic relationships ... You would clear your conscience, and any fault would lie, I suppose, at the door of the
national Government that was either permitting or at least
refusing to block this kind of trade. 10
Mr. Thomas Bamico, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts,
replied:
I'm not sure it would clear our conscience, because our conscience is based on so much history. To allow us to feel that we
were indirectly supporting what's going on in Burma would be so

ContractunlRelatiun.swithBurma: llpholdingFedemlism'sPurpose, 29 McGEORGEL REv. 351 (1998); Akhil Reed
Amar, Opinion, A Stoie's Rjght, a Govemmeni's ffivng; WASH. Posr, Mar. 19, 2000, at B1; Robert Stumberg,
Commentary, No Business in Burma., lLGAJ.. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 2000, at 58.
For articles challenging state and local authority, see, e.g., Anne Q. Conaughton, Factoring U.S.
ExpmtControlsandSanctionslntolnterruaional TradeDecisiuns, 27 Sn.ISON L. REv. 1211 (1998); Brannon
P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, The Constitutionality of State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign
Countries: Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HAsTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 307 (1999);
Lucien J. Dhooge, The lfumg Way to Mandalay: The Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Ad and the
Con.stitutiun, 37 AM. Bus. LJ. 387 (2000); Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions
Laws with Obligations Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1259 (1998);
David R Moran, No Panacea: Analyzing Sandions Before Impositwn, 27 STETSON L REv. 1403 (1998);
Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39
HARv.INT'L LJ. 443 (1998); David R Schmahmann &James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and
Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. ThANSNAT'L
L. 175 (1997);Jennifer Loeb-CedeiWall, Note, Restrictions on Trade with Burma: Bold Muues or Foolish
Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 929 (1998); Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, States' Rights and Foreign
Policy, 79 FOREIGN AFF.,Jan./Feb. 2000, at 9.
10. Oral Argument Transcript at 12, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct.
2288 (2000) (No. 99-474).
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contrary to the principles that underlie our own State constitution,
which refers to unalienable rights; the point of view of Massachusetts [is that] universal rights are at stake here. 11
Justice Souter then asked, Olet's assume ... that the Massachusetts
statute is preempted. What will Massachusetts do then? ... [W] ill you
continue to find ways to express yourselves and your conscience, even if
there is a preemption?" 12 Justice Souter's question will be very much on
the minds of the state and local officials who remember the success of
the South Mrica boycott, which taught them to consider both moral
and economic consequences in making decisions as consumers in the
global economy. If Massachusetts and other local governments with
Burma laws want to continue expressing their consciences through
laws, they will have to first consider what the Crosby decision preempts
and which options still remain available.
A global leader on matters of conscience, Archbisho[rEmeritus Desmond Tutu, defines Burma as the South Africa of today. 13 His analogy
refers not only to the magnitude of human rights violations in Burma, as
compared to South Mrica under Apartheid, but also to the nonviolent
economic advocacy favored by campaigns to free-Burma, which are modeled after the advocacy that helped bring down Apartheid. 14
Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Laureate leader of the Burmese government elected in 1990, called for U.S. citizens to "use your freedom to
protect ours." 15 Still the head of her party, the National League for

11. Id. at 12-13. "For more than two hundred years, citizens of Massachusetts and other states
have used boycotts to support the natural, essential and unalienable rights' of people around the
world." Brieffor Massachusetts at 10, Crosby (No. 99-474).
12. Oral Argument Transcript at 13, Crosby (No. 99-474).
13. See Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, Opinion, A Buycott for Burma, the South Africa of the
'90s, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 1996, at A-23; From South Africa to Burma, editorial, BosroN GLOBE,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 12.
14. See Kenneth A. Rodman, "Think GlobaUy, Punish LocaUy": Nonstate Actors, Multinational
Ctnporation, and Human Rights Sanctions, 12 Ennes & INT'L AFF. 19, 22-31 (1998). The Massachusetts Burma law was conceived at a news conference on the end of sanctions against South Mrica.
At that event, Simon Billenness suggested to Delegate Byron Rushing that the South Aftican
measure that was being withdrawn would be just as appropriate if applied verbatim to Burma
instead of South Aftica. See Carey Goldberg, After Difeat, Campaigner for "Free Burma • Begins Anew,
N.Y. TIMES,june 24,2000, atA-6.
15. The full context for her call was as follows:
Part of our struggle is to make the international community understand that we are a
poor country not because there is an insufficiency of resources and investment, but
because we are deprived of the basic institutions and practices that make for good
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Democracy ("NLD"), she encourages "people's boycotts" that deny the
current military dictatorship the political legitimacy and foreign exchange
it needs. 16 She identifies state and local government participation not
merely as an instrument of foreign policy, but as an exercise of "consumer
power," adding that "in some ways it's better to have the people of the
world on your side than the governments of the world, even if governments can be more effective in certain directions. "17
The anti-Apartheid movement built momentum for its "people's
boycott" by enlisting state and local governments in the United States

government. There are multinational business concerns which have no inhibitions
about dealing with repressive regimes. Their justification for economic involvement in
Burma is that their presence will actually assist the process of democratization.
Investment that only goes to enrich an already wealthy elite bent on monopolizing both
economic and political power cannot contribute towards legality and justice, the
foundation stones for a sound democracy. I would therefore like to call upon those who
have an interest in expanding their capacity for promoting intellectual freedom and
humanitarian ideals to take a principled stand against companies which are doing
business with the military regime of Burma. Please use your liberty to promote ours.
Aung San Suu Kyi, Commencement Address at American University 3 Uan. 26, 1997) (delivered
on her behalf by her late husband, Dr. Michael Aris) (transcript on file with author).
16. In a February 2000 interview, Aung San Suu Kyi stated that "[b]y investing now, business
is supporting the military regime. The real benefits of investment now go to the military regime
and their connections." Bernard Krisher, 'Start With Unity,' Democracy Leader Uyges Bunna; Q&A I
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Im'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 17, 2000, at 2. In an August 2000 interview, she
elaborated further:
If you look at what happened in the Philippines under the Marcos dictatorship, there
were no sanctions. People invested very freely there and the elite just got wealthier and
wealthier while the rest of the people were kept scrambling around garbage piles. It's
exactly the same here. And in South Mrica, sanctions were effective against the
Apartheid regime. Burma is not different.
Katherine Smyth, Face to Face with Suu Kyi, THE IRISH TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at 60. Daw Suu's defense
of her boycott strategy parallels remarks by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who argued that people
who are already suffering need alternatives to violence. Tutu stated:
You get all sorts of people saying all sorts of things about sanctions: Twiddle! It's
baloney of the first order! Because you are speaking about people who are already
suffering, and you are saying you are trying to find some way that is a nonviolent strategy
for bringing about the change that everybody says they want.
Seven Greenhouse, A Weapon for Consumers: the Boycott Returns, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 26, 2000, at
§ 4, at4.
17. Leslie Kean & Dennis Bernstein, Aung San Suu Ky, Interview, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1997,
at28-29.
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to JOin a campaign that had been organized by non-governmentorganizations ("NGO"s). The movement grew to include twenty-five
states and 164 local governments that adopted either a procurement
(or "selective purchasing") boycott of companies doing business in
South Mrica or a policy to divest the stock of those companies by public
pension funds. 18 The participation of U.S. state and local governments
in the South Mrica boycotts enabled the international campaign to
reach critical mass, particularly in the financial services sector. When
the free-Burma campaign started down the same track a decade later, it
picked up the support of twenty-<>ne local governments. 19 While many
of these were college towns, the cities of New York, San Francisco, and
Los Angeles also joined the boycott. Fearing the consequences of a
South Mrica-style boycott, the corporate community marshaled its
forces and mounted a preemptive strike in U.S. federal court against
Massachusetts, the first state to join the boycott. 20
This challenge to Massachusetts's purchasing power pitted the corporate establishment against the state and local government establishment. Joining the 600 members of plaintiff National Foreign Trade
Council ("NFTC") were twelve business associations, 21 twenty-seven
former federal officials, twenty members of Congress, the European
Union, and, in the final hour, the Clinton Administration. On the
other side, Massachusetts was supported by the eight major associations

18. Rodman, supra note 14, at 27; Kenneth P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislatiun, 61 TuL. L. REv. 469,471-475 {Feb. 1987).
19. The 21local govemments to adopt "Burma laws" included Alameda County, CA, and the
cities of Ann Arbor, MI; Berkeley, CA; Boulder, CO; Brookline, MA; Carboro, NC; Chapel Hill,
NC; Los Angeles, CA; Madison, WI; New York, NY; Newton, MA; Oakland, CA; Palo Alto, CA;
Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; Santa Monica,
CA; Somerville, MA; Takoma Park, MD; and West Hollywood, CA. INVESTOR REsPONSIBIU1Y
REsEARCH CENTER, STATE & LocAL GoVERNMENTS WITH CoUNTRY-SPECIFIC SELECTIVE PuRCHASING
LAws, app. F {chart) {1998) [hereinafter IRRC REPORT 1998].
20. See infra Part liD for a discussion of why a state purchasing law is more vulnerable than a
city purchasing law to the charge that it is interfering with the President's ability to develop a
multilateral Burma strategy.
21. The following business associations supported the NFTC: Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Council for Intemational
Business, the Organization for Intemational Investment, the American Petroleum Institute, the
American Insurance Association, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Connecticut Business and
Industry Association, the Retailers Association of Massachusetts, and the Industry Coalition on
Technology. Brief of Amici Curiae Council of Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al.,
Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 {2000) {No. 99-474).
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of state and local governments, 22 twenty-two state attorneys general, 23
sixteen local governments, 24 seventy-eight members ofCongress, 25 and
sixty-four nonprofit organizations. 26

22. The following government associations supported Massachusetts: the Council of State
Governments, the National Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, the International
City/County Management Association, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, and the
U.S. Conference of Mayors. Brief of Amici Curiae The Council of State Governments et al., Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99474), (No. 99474).
23. Joining the brief submitted by Heidi Heitcamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, in
support of Massachusetts, were the attorneys general of the following states: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, Utah, Vermont and Washington. Brief of Amici Curiae the State of Arkansas et al., Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99474).
24. Joining the brief submitted by Alan Hevesi, Comptroller of the City of New York, in
support of Massachusetts, were the following local governments: Alameda County, CA; Amherst,
MA; Berkeley, CA; Brookline, MA; Boulder, CO; Carrboro, NC; Los Angeles, CA; Newton, MA;
North Olmstead, OH; Oakland, CA; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco,
CA; and Santa Cruz, CA. Brief of Amici Curiae the New York City Comptroller et al., Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99474).
25. The following members of Congress submitted the brief in support of Massachusetts:
Senators Barbara Boxer (CA), Edward Kennedy (MA), John Kerry (MA), and Paul Wellstone
(MN), and Representatives Neil Abercrombie (HI), Tammy Baldwin (WI), Howard Berman ( CA),
David Bonior (MI) Sherrod Brown (OH), Michael Capuano (MA), Julia Carson (IN), William
Clay (MO), Eva Clayton (NC),John Conyers (MI),Joseph Crowley (NY), Danny Davis (IL), Peter
Defazio (OR), William Delahunt (MA), RosaDeLauro (CT),Julian Dixon (CA), Lane Evans (IL),
Barney Frank (MA) ,Jim Gibbons (NV), Benjamin Gilman (NY), Luis Gutierrez (IL), Earl Hilliard
(AL), Maurice Hinchey (NY) ,Jesse Jackson,Jr., (IL), Stephanie Tubbs Jones (OH), March Kaptur
(OH), Sue Kelly (NY), Carolyn Kilpatrick (MI), Peter King (NY), Tom Lantos (CA), Barbara Lee
(CA), Sheila Jackson Lee (TX),John Lewis (GA), Edward Markey (MA), Matthew Martinez (CA),
James McGovern (MA), Martin Meehan (MA), Gregory Meeks (NY) ,Juanita Millender-McDonald
(CA), George Miller (CA), Patsy Mink, (HI),Joseph Moakley (MA),Jerry Nadler (NY), Richard
Neal (MA), Eleanor Holmes Norton (DC) ,James Oberstar (MN) ,John Olver (MA), Major Owens
(NY), Bill Pascrell (NJ), Nancy Pelosi (CA), Thomas Petri (WI), Richard Pombo (CA), Dana
Rohrabacher (CA), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL), Lucille Roybali-Allard (CA), Bobby Rush (IL),
Bernie Sanders (VT),Janice Schakowsky (IL), Christopher Smith (NJ), Mark Souder (IN), Pete
Stark (CA), Ted Strickland (OH), Bennie Thompson (MS),John Tierney (MA), Edophus Towns
(NY), James Traficant (OH), Mark Udall (CO), Tom Udall (AZ), Maxine Waters (CA), Melvin
Watt (NC), Henry Waxman (CA), Lynn Woolsey (CA) and David Wu (OR). Brief of Amici Curiae
Members of Congress, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No.
99474).
26. The following nonprofit organizations joined the brief submitted by the Harvard
Immigration and Refugee Clinic (with the Harvard Human Rights Program) in support of
Massachusetts: Alliance for Democracy, American Lands Alliance, Arise Resource Center, As You
Sow Foundation, Asia Pacific Center for Justice & Peace, Boston Mobilization for Survival, Burma
Lifeline, Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America (Maryknoll Fathers & Brothers), Center for
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As this convergence of interests suggests, the stakes were higher than
the survival of a single procurement law. All of these parties were taking
sides in a larger struggle over the role of government purchasing power
in a global economy. In the words of Professor Akhil Amar, the states
were defending their "consumer sovereignty" in a way that is "altruistic
and noble. "27 In the words of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
corporate coalition was opposing the "substantial economic leverage"
of state purchasing power, particularly the "especially powerful and
controversial" use of secondary boycotts, which forces companies to
choose between doing business in Burma and maintaining a presence
in the domestic market of state and local governments. 28 The choice
was a real one; state procurement totaled $730 billion in 1996, which
was 79% of public procurement, 29 as compared with federal procurement of $199 billion. 30 The stakes were heightened in this particular
conflict because of the "universally repulsive behavior of the Burmese

Constitutional Rights, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Center for Economic Justice,
Center for International Environmental Law, Center for Labor & Community Research, Citizens
Action Network, Consumers Choice Council, Coop America, Defenders of Wildlife, Delta County
(CO) Alliance for Democracy, Dictator Watch, Dominican Sisters of Hope, EarthAction, EarthRights International, East Timor Action Network/U.S., Edmonds Institute, Free Burma Coalition,
Free Burma-No Petro Dollars, Global Exchange, Human Rights Watch, Humane Society
International, Humane Society of the United States, Independent Voters of Dlinois--Independent Precinct Organization, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, International Committee
of Lawyers for Tibet, International Human Rights Clinic-University of California School of Law,
International Human Rights Law Group, International Labor Rights Fund, International League
for Human Rights, International Rivers Network, Jesse Smith Noyes Foundation, Jewish Labor
Committee-NY, Langley United Church, Long Island Progressive Coalition, Los Angeles Burma
Forum, Merrimack Valley People for Peace, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, National
Lawyers Guild- MA Chapter, New England Burma Roundtable, Philadelphia Burma Roundtable, Physicians for Human Rights, Project Maje, Rainforest Relief, Reverend Frank GriswoldPresiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church (USA), Rev. Thomas Shaw- Presiding Bishop of the
Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, Ruckus Society, Seattle Burma Roundtable, Sierra Club,
Sisters of St. Joseph- Office of Peace and Justice, Songbird Foundation, Sustainable America,
Synapses, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, United for a Fair Economy, Ursuline Sisters
of Tildonk (NY), Ustawi, Washington Biotechnology Action Council, Women's Division of the
General Board of Global Ministries -United Methodist Church, and the Women's International
League for Peace & Freedom. Brief of Amici Curiae Non-profit Organizations, Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, I20 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474).
27. Amar, supra note 9.
28. Brief of Amici Curiae Council of Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. at 5,
Crosby (No. 99-474).
29. U.S. DEP'ToFCoMMERCE, STATISUCALAllsTRACfOFTiiEUNITEDSTATES (1999) 317, tbl. 512,
available at http:/ /www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec09.pdf.
30. U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPoRT-FY 1999 2, FEDERAL CoNTRAcr
AcnoNsANo DoLLARS (Jan. 2000).
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govemment" 31 and the complex web of economic relationships linking
that behavior to multinational corporations and implicating the policies of the United States, Europe, andjapan. 32
After the corporate strategy ultimately proved successful in invalidating the Massachusetts Burma law, (but only on preemption grounds),
Professor Jack Goldsmith concluded that the decision "has no implications for state foreign relations activities beyond state laws regulating
transactions with Burma." 33 However, this conclusion gives little solace
to the state and local governments that now must decide whether and
how to replace their selective purchasing laws that target companies
doing business in Burma.
Going beyond Burma, the Crosby decision may well have implications for other selective purchasing laws. One reason is that
the tension ·between a state boycott and federal sanctions could
recur in the future. In addition to country-specific measures, such
as the federal Burma sanctions and the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act, Congress has given the President the discretion to
impose economic sanctions under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to deal with an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the "national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States." 34 IEEPA gives the President very broad
discretion. Considering the vagueness of "obstacle preemption" as
applied in Crosby, IEEPA could be used by multinational companies
and trade associations to attack market participation policies of state
and local governments if those policies affect companies that invest
or trade within a country that becomes the subject of federal
sanctions. 35
To provide legal context for the Crosby decision, Part II explains how
the Massachusetts law worked, how the federal Burma sanctions law
worked, and how the Supreme Court framed its obstacle preemption
analysis. Part III then addresses whether the remaining state and local

31. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 479.
32. I d. at 479-84.
33. Jack Goldsmith, Commentary, State Foreign Policies After the Burma Case, WRIT, at http:/ I
writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20000626_goldsmith.html Uune 2000). Frank Kittredge, President of the NFTC, was relatively cautious in claiming that the Crosby decision "should help put an
end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy." USA*Engage, Supreme Courl Rules Massachusetts Burma Law Unconstitutional, judgment ofFirst Circuit Courl Affirmed, at http:/ jwww. usaengage.org/
supremecourt.html Uune 19, 2000).
34. 50 u.s.c. § 1701 (1994).
35. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 4, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474).
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policy options can avoid preemption under the federal Burma sanctions. Part IV addresses whether the options that are not preempted
would retain significant power to promote human rights.

II.
A

PREEMPTION OF THE BURMA BOYCOTT

The Burma/South Africa Boycott Model in Massachusetts

Adopted in June 1996, Massachusetts' Burma law prohibited
agencies from contracting with businesses on a "restricted purchase
list" of companies doing business in Burma. 36 Exempted from this
list were businesses operating in Burma to report the news, provide
international telecommunications, 37 or provide medical supplies. 38
The state would accept a bid from a company on the restricted list
under three circumstances: (1) when a company doing business in
Burma was the only offer or its absence would result in inadequate
competition; 39 (2) when the state was purchasing certain medical
supplies; 40 and (3) when there was no comparable bid from a
company not on the restricted list. 41 Comparable bids were defined
as those within ten percent of the bid from a company on the
restricted list. 42 Thus, the state characterized its law not as a complete ban, but as a strong "preference" against companies that
conducted business in Burma. 43
The law defined "doing business in Burma" broadly. The definition included: (1) having a principal place of business or operations in Burma; (2) providing financial services to the government of Burma; (3) promoting imports or sale of gems, timber, oil,
gas, or other products controlled by the government of Burma; or
(4) providing goods or services to the government of Burma.
Delegate Byron Rushing, the sponsor of the legislation, explained
that the law was predicated on the Massachusetts anti-Apartheid
policy. 44

36. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 22H(a) (West 2000 Supp.).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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§ 22H(e).
§ 221.
§ 22H(b) (1)-(2).
§ 221.
§ 22H(d).
§ 22G.
Brieffor Massachusetts at 6, Crosby (No. 99-474).
Byron Rushing, The People Have Spoken, BURMA DEBATE, Summer 1999, at 4, 5.
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B.

The Federal Burma Law Adopted Uy Congress

As Massachusetts follow its previous anti-Apartheid boycott, the
federal Burma law adopted by Congress parallels the federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in most respects. The likely recurrence of
this match-up between state and federal responses to a brutal dictatorship undoubtedly informed the NFfC's decision to litigate a "test case,"
which NFfC members claim had "nothing to do with Burma." 45
Congress adopted the federal Burma law in September, 1996, three
months after Massachusetts adopted its law. 46 The federal law included
the most significant sanctions imposed against Burma by any nation. At
the same time, the law's limited approach also reflects successful
lobbying by the anti-sanctions coalition. 47
The federal Burma law imposed three sanctions on Burma and
authorized the President to impose additional limited sanctions or to
waive any sanctions under certain conditions. The three immediate
sanctions included: (1) a ban on aid to the government of Burma
except for humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics efforts, and promotion of human rights and democracy; 48 (2) a mandate for U.S.
representatives to international institutions to vote against loans and
other financial assistance to the government of Burma; 49 and (3) a
prohibition on entry visas to officials of the Burmese government,
except for those required to fulfill treaty obligations and United
Nations missions. 5° The federal law will maintain these sanctions until
the President determines that Burma has made "measurable and
substantial progress in improving human rights practices and implementing democratic government. "51
The federal law also authorizes the President to prohibit "United States
persons" from making "new investment" in Burma if the President determines that the government of Burma has (1) physically harmed, rearrested, or exiled Aung San Suu Kyi, or (2) committed large-scale repres-

45. Donna Smith, U.S. business group challenges state sanctions law, Reuters newswire (May 1,
1998), availableathttp://www.usaengage.org/news/980501reut.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2000);
Frank Kittredge, President of the NITC, Address at the Crosby v. National Fareign Trade Council
Panel, Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University (June 28, 2000) (on file with author).
46. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
Pub. L.104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997) [hereinafterfederal Burma law].
47. Rodman, supra note 14, at32.
48. § 570(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3009-166.
49. § 570(a)(2).
50. § 570(a)(3).
51. § 570(a).
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sion or violence against the Democratic opposition. 52 The federal act
defines "new investment" narrowly. It includes contracts or ownership
interests in "economical development of resources located in Burma," but
it does not include "entry into, performance of, or financing of a contract
to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology." 53 President Clinton
invoked this authority on May 20, 1997, when he issued an Executive
Order to ban new investment in Burma. 54
The federal law also authorizes the President to waive any of the
federal sanctions on Burma, either temporarily or permanently, if the
President determines that the sanction is "contrary to the national
security interests of the United States."55 It also directs the President to
develop a "comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to
and improve human rights practices and the quality oflife in Burma." 56
The act's diplomatic instructions include cooperation with members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") and other
countries that have major trade and investment interests in Burma.
Finally, the act sets a diplomatic objective of fostering dialogue between
the government of Burma and democratic opposition groups. 5 7
C.

Preemption Under Crosby

Congress did not state that it intended to preempt the state and local
Burma laws that predated the federal sanctions on Burma. 58 In its Crosby
decision, the Court explained that in cases where Congress has not
expressed its intent to preempt state law, the Court can still find that a law
is preempted if it interprets an implied congressional intent to do so. The
Court has found implied preemption in cases where Congress intended to
"occupy the field," 59 or where the state law conflicted with the federal law
in question. 60 A "conflict" occurs when a private party cannot comply with
both the state law and the federal law at the same time. 61 The Massachu-

52. § 570(b).
53. § 570(f) (2).
54. Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 13047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997).
55. § 570(e).
56. § 570(c).
57. § 570(c).
58. See generally§ 570.
59. See, e.g., United Statesv. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1151-52 (2000); Charleston & W. Carolina
Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 597-98, 600, 604 (1915).
60. See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 ( 1989); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
61. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43.
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setts Burma law, however, did not flunk this objective comparison. Rather,
the NFTC persuaded the Court that the state law was an obstacle to
achieving the. "intended purpose and 'natural effect'" of the Burma
sanctions adopted by Congress. 62
The leading precedent for obstacle preemption is Hines v. Davidowitz., in
which the Court applied a purpose-and-effect test looking at the state law
"as a whole." 63 This test is necessarily subjective; it requires the Court to
resolve a policy conflict that Congress might resolve differently.64 In the
words of the Fourth Circuit, "preemption under a frustration of federal
purpose theory is more an exercise of policy choices by a court than strict
statutory construction. "65
In Crosby, Justice Souter wrote that the Massachusetts Burma law was
an obstacle to accomplishing three objectives of the federal Burma law:
to delegate discretion to the President to achieve a political result; to
set limits on the range of permissible sanctions; and to give the
President authority to speak for the United States in order to develop a
multilateral Burma strategy. 66
First, the Court held that the Massachusetts law undermined congressional delegation of discretion to the President to achieve a political
result by adding or subtracting from the sanctions as necessary. The
Court reasoned that if states adopt an inflexible sanction, they undermine the President's authority to use access to the "national economy"
as either a carrot or a stick to promote the desired result of negotiations
to set up elections in Burma. 67 In addition to promoting a democratic

62. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2294 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 n.20 (1941); Savage v.Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
63. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67.
64. The district court in this case felt that the preemption claim did not even merit
argument. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 292 (D. Mass. 1998)
("Plaintiff must show that Congress intended to exercise its authority to set aside a state law.
Plaintiff's burden is particularly heavy because Plaintiff argues implied, rather than express,
preemption. Plaintiff has failed to carry this burden." (citations omitted)).
65. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988). For a sampling of
commentators who describe the subjectivity of obstacle preemption theory, see Paul E. McGreal,
Some RUe With Your Chevron~: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv. 823, 833 (1995) ("That [obstacle preemption] requires a largely ad hoc policy analysis is
evidenced by the Court's minimally helpful guidance."); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv.
225, 232 (2000) ("modern preemption jurisprudence is a muddle.").
66. 120 S. Ct. at 2294.
67. I d. at 2296. Justice Souter implied that the federal Burma law enabled the President to
fully restrain or apply the "coercive power of the national economy," when the federal law limits
the President to imposing a ban on future investment in developing resources in Burma, and it
excludes from this ban all contracts for goods or services. Compare id., with Foreign Operations FY
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result in Burma, the Court stressed that Congress also gave the President discretion to suspend sanctions for national security reasons. 68
The elements of the Massachusetts Burma law that the Court cited as an
obstacle to the President's flexibility included: ( 1) use of a methodology that the President did not control; (2) use of a methodology that
might undermine the President's bargaining position; and (3) the
immediate and perpetual nature of the state measure. 69
Second, the Court held that the Massachusetts law interfered with
the intent of Congress to steer a "middle path" with sanctions that are
limited to "United States persons" only, that are limited to "new
investment," and that exclude trade in goods and services. 70 Massachusetts argued that the state law furthered the federal purpose, but the
Court reasoned that a difference of methodology could be fatal even if
the state and federal laws actually do share the same purpose. 71 The
Court characterized the congressional definition of "new investment"
as a "calibrated" policy, in part because Congress had considered and
rejected tougher sanctions such as limits on imports or prohibitions on
all investment. 72 In the Court's reading of the federal law, that calibration was designed to not only bar what the federal law prohibits, but
also to allow what the federal law permits. 73 The Court cited several
elements of the Massachusetts Burma law as obstacles to the congressional calibration of force. The state law (1) was a secondary boycott,
which involved third parties rather than direct "Burmese connections";
(2) reached beyond "U.S. persons" to include corporations based in
other nations; (3) penalized companies that traded in goods and
services, which reached beyond the definition of"new investment"; and
(4) penalized companies with pre-existing affiliates, which reached
beyond the definition of "new investment. "74

1997 Appropriations, Pub. L. 104-208, § 570(f) (2), 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997). The coercive power
of the national economy is not available to the President under the federal Burma law.
§ 570(f) (2).
68. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2295 (2000).
69. !d. at 2296.
70. ld. at 2297-98.
71. ld. at 2298 n.14 ("Identity of ends does not end our analysis of preemption.") (citing
Wisconsin Dep't. oflndus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282,286 (1986)).
72. ld. at 2296-97 n.13.
73. ld. at 2298. The federal Burma law does not actually state what it intends to permit; it only
defines what the President may prohibit. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L.1 04-208, § 5 70, 110 Stat. 3009-166 ( 1997).
74. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2297 (2000).
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Third, the Court held that the Massachusetts Burma law interfered
with the President's ability to speak for the United States in developing
a multilateral Burma strategy, as intended by Congress. The Court
described the President's diplomatic role as a "clear mandate" under
Article II of the Constitution 75 and reiterated that "the President's
maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity to bargain for the
benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for
enclaves fenced offwilly-nilly by inconsistent political tactics." 76
This assertion of the President's power of persuasion based on access
to the national market is particularly interesting in the context of
preemption. The federal Burma law gives the President only the power
to bargain over future U.S. investment in Burma, not the capacity to
bargain for access to the "entire national economy.'m Additionally, the
evidence cited by the Court that the Massachusetts law was an obstacle
to the President's capacity to bargain had nothing to do with Burma.
The Court echoed the leading argument in the NFTC's complaint, that
the Massachusetts law created a rift between the United States and the
European Uniori, not regarding Burma strategy, but about compliance
with trade agreements:
In early 1997, European Union Ambassador Hugo Paeman
wrote a letter ... warning that the Massachusetts Burma law is a
"breach of U.S. international obligations and as such could
have a damaging effect on EU-US relations." Onjune 20 1997,
the EU formally noted its position that the Massachusetts
Burma law violated the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.78
All three federal courts have cited the diplomatic tension over compliance with trade agreements as justification for overturning the state law,
either on constitutional grounds by the district court79 and the First
Circuit,80 or on preemption grounds by the Supreme Court. 81 Massachu-

75. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the President to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors); § 3 (granting the President the power to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers).
76. 120 S. Ct. at 2298-99.
77. See§ 570(f)(2).
78. Amended Complaint at 5, National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287
(D. Mass.1998) (CANo. 98-10757).
79. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (D. Mass 1998).
80. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,54 (1st Cir. 1999).
81. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2299-230_1 (2000).
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setts and its seventy-eight congressional amici argued, however, that in the
WTO implementing legislation, Congress explicitly foreclosed use of trade
conflicts as evidence of an encroachment on federal powers. 82 The WTO
legislation "occupies the field" and prohibits all private rights of action "in
connection with" WTO agreements,83 including "indirect" claims such as
one based on Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 84 In addition, under
the WTO legislation, only the U.S. government can challenge a state law
based on a conflict with a WTO agreement,85 which Massachusetts argued
was the legislated channel for handling a federal/state disagreement over
its Burma law. 86 At the very least, Massachusetts (joined by members of
Congress) argued, where Congress had not expressed its intent to preempt state law, the WTO legislation presumes that state law is not implicitly preempted in the event of a conflict (or an alleged conflict) with trade
agreements. 87
Like the First Circuit, the Supreme Court dismissed this argument by
observing that the Massachusetts Burma law was preempted by the
federal Burma law, not the WTO agreement, and. the federal government's failure to challenge the state law as required under the WTO
legislation was irrelevant to the "preemptive effect of the federal
sanctions against Burma." 88 In other words, the Court was not daunted
by the fact that the WTO legislation precludes indirect causes of action,
like the NFTC complaint in this case, that rely upon mere allegations of
conflict between WTO agreements and state law.
In the long run, the Supreme Court's acceptance of this bootstrap
formula may be more significant than its decision to strike down one
state law. The line of reasoning in Crosby enables the Executive Branch
to avoid suing states directly, which it lacked the political will to do in
this case, and enables private parties to use WTO arguments to demonstrate a conflict with the President's "power to persuade" under another statute, even though Congress denied standing to make the same
arguments directly.
Previous cases have raised the question of whether the need for "one
voice" in foreign affairs should preempt a state law in the absence of an

82. Brief for Massachusetts at 20, Crosby (No. 99-474); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of
Congress at 11-13, Crosby (No. 99-474).
83. Uruguay Round Agreements Act,§ 102(c)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2) (1994).
84. /d. (approving H.R. Doc. No, 103-316, at 676 (1994)).
85. /d.§ 102(c)(l), § 3512(c)(1).
86. See Brieffor Massachusetts at 20, Crosby (No. 99-474).
87. /d. at 20-21; Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress at 11-13, Crosby (No. 99-474).
88. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2301 n.24 (2000).
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express statement of congressional intent to preempt. The Supreme
Court has defined the "one voice" as that of Congress: did Congress
consider, and implicitly accept, the overlap between federal law and a state
law that has foreign policy implications? 89 In this case, the Court concluded that neither the earlier date of the state law,90 nor the prior history
of congressional acceptance of the anti-Apartheid laws,91 nor the congressional anticipation of indirect challenges to state laws in connection with
WTO agreements92 were enough to establish that Congress had considered and accepted selective purchasing as the status quo ante for the federal
Burma sanctions. The Court stressed again that Congress' direction to the
President to develop a multilateral strategy, combined with the President's
own constitutional powers in foreign affairs, invested the President with
the "maximum authority of the National Govemment."93
In summary, this third aspect of preemption under Crosby, holding
that the state law was an obstacle to President's ability to speak for the
United States, the Court cited the following factors: (1) the federal
Burma law's direction to the President to develop a multilateral strategy; (2) complaints from Executive Branch officials that the state law
interfered with the ability of the Executive Branch to speak as the "one
voice" of the United States; and (3) allegations by the European Union
and other nations that the Massachusetts law did not comply with the
WTO Agreement on Procurement.
The most far-reaching aspect of preemption analysis under Crosby is the
application of obstacle preemption doctrine, per Hines v. Davidawitz, to the
need for "presidential voice." While the Court declined to comment on
the First Circuit's broad reading of federal foreign affairs power or
dormant Commerce Clause power, it nonetheless leaned on dicta from its
most expansive interpretations of federal power limitations on state
power.94 At the same time, the Court did not reach as far as its more recent
conservative interpretations of federal power such as Barclays Bank. 95

89. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 324,326, 329 (1994).
90. See 120 S. Ct. at 2291.
91. See id. at 2301-{)2.
92. See id. at 2301 n.24.
93. !d. at 2298.
94. !d. at 2299 n.16 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449
(1979) (discussing a dormant Commerce Clause claim, not a preemption claim); THE F'EoERAUsr
No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) Gacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ( "[t]he union will undoubtedly
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.").
95. In discussing Barclays, the Court said that Congress had taken specific actions rejecting
the positions of both foreign governments and the Executive, which compared to "nothing" in the
history of the federal Burma law, even though Massachusetts and congressional amici presented
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Justice Souter, who dissented in Barclay's, felt compelled to acknowledge
that case's holding, which stated that there is a presumption against
finding an implied preemption of state law in a traditional area of state
sovereignty like procurement. He noted that, assuming for purposes of
argument that there is a presumption against implied preemption of a
procurement law, the Massachusetts law nonetheless presented a sufficient obstacle to overcome that presumption. 96
In this light, Professor Goldsmith's conclusion about the limited
significance of Crosby seems to be overly optimistic as far as states are
concerned. While the Court presented its obstacle preemption test in
neutral terms, the Court's application of that test dismissed evidence
that Congress did not intend to preempt state and local law. It would be
prudent forJocal drafters to interpret the Court's non-presumption as
a presumption-in-fact, at least in the context of a federal law that
delegates diplomatic discretion and "voice" to the President.
At the same time, it would be overly pessimistic to ignore the
contextually specific nature of the Crosby analysis. The obstacle is in the
eye of the beholder, and the next court to hear an obstacle preemption
challenge will have to weigh a much different combination of statutory
elements. The Crosby decision creates a statutory framework of three
distinct elements with no less than eleven discrete arguments for
preemption. This degree of specificity makes the doctrinal rationale in
Crosby a flexible one: the eleven obstacles can be outlined and manipulated to identify a number of new legislative options. These new options
may allow states to draft laws that avoid rulings of preemption under
the federal Burma law- depending on a finding by the reviewing
courts that the laws contain none of the obstacle-elements of the
Massachusetts Burma law, and also comport with the spirit of the Crosby
analysis. The grounds for preemption cited by the Crosby Court are
summarized below.

D.

Potential Ways to Avoid Preemption

Each of the individual grounds for preemption can be avoided. This
is not to suggest that state and local governments must avoid each and
every ground in order to preclude preemption. Mter all, the Court
emphasized that its preemption analysis considered the Massachusetts

the history of congressional action on both selective purchasing and the potential for conflict
under WfO agreements. ld. at 230()..()1 (discussing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.,
512 u.s. 298, 327-29 (1994)).
96. 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.S.

2000]

127

LAW & POUCY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

Grounds for Preemption Under Crosby v. NFTC
1.

Obstacles to Presidential discretion. The state law addressed the same purpose as the
federal law, but the state law:
a.
used a methodology that the President did not control;
b.
used a different methodology that might undermine the President's
bargaining position;
c.
had an immediate economic impact; and
d.
had a perpetual legal existence.

2.

Obstacles to the Umited natpre of federal sanctions. The state law:
a.
was a secondary boycott. which involved third parties rather than the
congressional focus on "direct Burmese connections":
b.
reached beyond •u.s. persons• to include corporations based in other nations;
c.
penalized companies that traded in goods and services, which reached beyond the
defmition of ~new investment"; and
d.
penalized companies with pre-existing affiliates, which reached beyond the
definition of "new investment. •

3.

Obstacles to the President's role in developing a multilateral strategy. These
included:
a.
the federal· Burma law's direction to the President to develop a multilateral
strategy;
b.
the complaints from Executive Branch officials that the state law interfered with
the ability of the Executive Branch to speak as the "one voice• of the United
States; and
c.
the allegations by the European Union and other nations that the state law did not
comply with the WTO Agreement on Procurement.

~urma law as a whole. The purpose and effect of the "whole" can be
significantly transformed by changing its parts, as the following potential changes reveal.
• Narrow the purpose and scope to be "primary" rather than "secondary. "
Instead of seeking to influence a country, such as Burma, the local
purpose could be to abstain from doing business with individual
companies connected with violations of human rights, regardless
ofwhere those companies operate. For example, instead of affecting over 300 companies doing business in Burma, the law might
affect only a few companies. 97 In keeping with the Court's analysis,
this approach would be: (1) neutral with respect to Burma; and (2)
focused on primary business relationships, not a secondary. boycott.
• Avoid conflicts with trade aweements. Following the model of federal
procurement policy, a state could avoid the multilateral conflicts
produced by the Massachusetts Burma law by exempting products

97. See infra Part IV-B.
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or services from countries that are members of the WTO procurement agreement. Alternatively, conflict under the WTO agreement could be avoided by adopting the law at the local level, which
the WTO agreement does not cover.
• Limit duration of the law. In addition to the preceding choices, the
law can provide for its own suspension based upon actions of the
federal government. This option may not affect preemption analysis on the face of a statute, but it may help to avoid a lawsuit that
challenges the statute. This option also could provide a way for
state and local policies to interact with federal policy in order to
strengthen both levels.
• Use non-procurement methods. State or local governments can avoid
procurement altogether in favor of using disclosure, divestment,
shareholder resolutions, or political speech. Because they do not have
a direct economic effect, non-procurement methods can have a broad
"secondary" scope that covers all companies doing business in Burma.
Alternatively, they can have a narrow "primary" scope in order to
reduce administrative burdens or political opposition.
The remainder of this Article addresses two questions. Part III
addresses whether state and local policies that use some combination
of these approaches can avoid preemption by the federal Burma
sanctions. Part IV addresses whether such policies would retain significant power to promote human rights in a global economy.
III.

LoCAL OPTioNs AFrER CRosBY

The Massachusetts Burma law employed some (but not all) of the
statutory methods of economic advocacy that evolved from the antiApartheid era. It established a procurement limit and also required
disclosure of companies doing business in Burma. The Vermont Burma
law used a different mechanism to address its concerns about Burma.
Adopted in the midst of the Massachusetts litigation, the Vermont
Burma law relied on political speech (in the form of an introductory
resolution) and provisions directing public fund managers to vote for
shareholder resolutions, rather than focusing on procurement. 98 Other
Burma laws illustrate other possibilities. For example, the Burma
ordinances put forth by Oakland and Santa Cruz combine procurement, divestment, and political speech, but not disclosure. 99

98. An Act Relating to Doing Business with Burma (Myanmar), 1999 Vt. Acts & Res. 34.
99. See Santa Cruz Res. (City Council Policy Manual No. 29.12 §§II-IV (1997); Oakland Ord.
§§II-IV (1996), available in IRRC REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at app. F.
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Potential Combination of Options

Vertical axis =political visibility and economic significance.
Horizontal axis= likelihood offederal preemption.

The methodologies employed by pre-Croslry legislation can be sorted
in the order of greatest-to-least economic impact on private companies;
this order also reflects their level of preemption risk under Crosby.
1. Procurement boycott of companies that do business in Burma. However, this secondary boycott could be narrowed to cover only companies that have a primary connection to violations of human rights
(the Court found this option to be preempted by federal law).
2. Disclosur-e by companies of business they do (or do not do) in
Burma as a condition for procurement. Disclosure can be used as
a less-restrictive alternative to a primary procurement boycott.
3. Divestment of stock mvnership in companies doing business in
Burma.
4. Shar-eholder-resolutions that seek to develop corporate human rights
standards and accountability.
5. Political speech in either of two forms. The first is publication of the
names of companies doing business in Burma, with which the
state or local government must now do business. The second is
adoption of a legislative resolution that condemns human rights
violations by the government of Burma and the complicity of
corporations that support the military government.
These options can be combined in order to increase the political
visibility as well as the legal sustainability of a local policy. If options that
are at a higher risk of preemption were found to be vulnerable, the
lower-risk components of the policy would still remain in place with a
well-drafted severability clause. The following chart illustrates the
possible layers of a state or local policy. The broader the layer, the more
secure it is from legal challenge on grounds of preemption.
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The following sections analyze the risk of preemption for each of
these respective layers, starting with the option at the greatest risk of
preemption, procurement.
A.

Procurement

As interpreted by the Crosby Court, the federal Burma law preempted the Massachusetts Burma law because the state law created
an obstacle to congressional policy objectives, even though both
laws shared the same broad goal. The NFTC made much of the
purpose declared by the state law's sponsor, Representative Byron
Rushing, which was to promote a foreign policy purpose: democracy
. anoth er country. 100
m
When defending its Burma law, the Massachusetts attorney general argued more cautiously that the law served a local moral
purpose, 101 which was "to disassociate the Massachusetts government and its tax dollars from the denial of human rights in Burma.
There is no question on this record that the Massachusetts Legislature would have enacted the Burma Law even if it believed that it
could not affect change in Burma." 102 In short, Massachusetts
argued that its right to disassociate its spending from "a repugnant
regime" is a valid purpose, regardless of whether the law might serve
a broader foreign policy goal. 103
The NITC argued, in effect, that a secondary boycott cannot serve a
local purpose because its ultimate objective is to avoid doing business
with a country, and individual companies doing business in Burma may
have no direct connection to the human rights abuses. When asked by
the Court to compare the secondary boycott to a boycott of goods
derived from Burma, counsel to the NITC responded, "that's a very
different case. [The secondary boycott] is not limited to goods coming
from Burma. [Massachusetts is saying,] [w]e're not going to buy
computers from a German company because they sell pencils to Burma

100. See Rushing, supra note 44, at 7. Representative Byron Rushing, stated that "if you're
going to engage in foreign policy, you have to be able to identifY a goal that you will know when
it is realized ... [T]he identifiable goal is, free democratic elections in Burma." National
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998); see Rushing, supra note
44, at 7.
101. See, e.g., Brieffor Massachusetts at 48, Croslly (No. 99-4 74) ("the Court should uphold the
law because it has a legitimate local purpose: to disassociate Massachusetts from the human rights
violations in Burma.").
102. Id. at 31-32.
103. !d. at 32.
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... That is highly coercive, and it has nothing to do ... with the notion
of disassociation. " 104
This distinction between primary and secondary boycotts is the basic
idea behind an alternative procurement standard. The primaryI
secondary distinction is well developed in U.S. labor law; the National
Labor Relations Act prohibits unions from engaging in secondary
boycotts, but not primary boycotts. 105 A union may not refuse to handle
goods of a "secondary" business, with which the union has no complaint, in order to put economic pressure on the "primary" business
with which the union has a complaint. 106 The Supreme Court has
recognized that a primary labor boycott may legally have incidental
effects upon secondary employers who deal with boycotted goods. 107
The labor law analogy does more than define the difference between
primary and secondary boycotts: it suggests that if a primary boycott can
withstand judicial scrutiny under an explicit prohibition of secondary
boycotts by Congress, then a primary procurement boycott would
withstand even strict judicial scrutiny under the obstacle preemption
doctrine. A primary boycott of individual companies based on their
own conduct can be distinguished from the purpose and effect of a
secondary boycott based more broadly on doing business in Burma,
which the Court has found t<? be an obstacle to the objectives of federal
sanctions. 108

104. Oral Argument Transcript at 26, Crosby (No. 99-474). Also during oral argument,
Timothy Dyk, counsel for the NITC, argued that secondary boycotts "only work if you communicate disapproval [of a country]. or communicate a desire to change." He acknowledged that if
Massachusetts sought to avoid goods made in Burma that would be "a different case," although the
NITC's position is that a boycott of goods made in Burma would also be unconstitutional and
presumably preempted by the federal Burma sanctions as welL /d. at 26-27.
105. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § l58(b) (4) (2000).
106. The Supreme Court has had numerous occasions to elaborate on the distinction
between primary and secondary boycotts. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen,
377 U.S. 58, 91 (1964); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,466 (1921) (defining a
secondary boycott as an "exercise [of] coercive pressure upon ... customers ... in order to cause
them to withhold orwithdrawpatronage" from the party with whom a union has a complaint). It is
conceivable that companies would argue that they are merely "customers" of government
ministries or private firms in Burma that violate human rights. This distinction is not valid for at
least two reasons. First, many of those companies are joint venture partners with government
ministries, not merely customers. Second, even if they were "customers," a downstream boycott of
goods or services is still "primary" if the goods or services retain a competitive benefit (because of
the human rights violations) or if the downstream boycott is "against the merchandise" or service
of the primary producer. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7.
107. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 217 n.9 (1982).
108. See infra Part IV-B-2.
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a

A primary boycott of individual companies is much narrower than
boycott of all goods made in Burma. 109 It is a boycott of specific
companies, or companies within a defined economic sector, based
specifically upon the behavior and harm caused by companies connected to violations of human rights. For example, some oil and gas
companies benefit from the use of forced labor. Forced labor is not
merely regulated conduct, it is a crime under international law that
applies to governments, private individuals, and companies alike. 110
Thus, a primary procurement standard seeks to disassociate from
particular companies because they are connected to violations of
international law. Such a standard is much narrower-and also more
difficult to establish-than merely finding that a company does business within a repressive nation like Burma.
For a procurement limit to avoid preemption under the Crosby
analysis, it must be neutral with respect to companies that are simply
doing business in Burma. Many companies do business in Burma (or
even business with the government of Burma) without any complicity
in human rights violations other than the indirect complicity of providing financial support to the government. Conversely, a company that
does no business in Burma but benefits elsewhere from violations of
human rights could be affected by a primary procurement policy.
In short, a "primary" procurement standard would disassociate a
government purchaser from companies that are complicit in violations
of human rights. Two elements require statutory definition - human
rights and complicity. The review of human rights abuses in Burma in
part IV-B below illustrates three options for defining the human rights
element, each of which is recognized in an international human rights
agreement:
• repression of labor rights of association; 111

109. Several commentators have described a boycott of goods made in Burma as a "primary"
boycott because it does not avoid business with companies simply because they do business in
Burma. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in aPost-Prinz World, 36 TuLSA L.J. 11, 26
n. 87 (2000).
110. See INT'L LABOR 0RG., FORCED LABOUR IN MYANMAR (BURMA) § 204 (1998) [hereinafter
ILO REPORT].
111. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (No. 87), entered into force, july 4, 1950, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; see also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 22.1, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 1171 ("Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.") [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 20, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAORPt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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• forced relocation; 112 and
• forced labor. 113
Approximately twenty-three of the 329 foreign companies doing
business in Burma operate in sectors where human rights violations are
prevalent, and an additional thirty-four firms have withdrawn from
those sectors but could return if the business climate becomes more
tolerant of human rights abuses. 114 However, not all of these firms sell
products or services that are purchased by governments. Roughly,
there are at least six companies that operate in sectors where human
rights violations are prevalent and these companies are also active in
procurement markets; an additional nine firms have withdrawn from
those sectors but could, likewise, return if the business climate becomes
more tolerant of human rights abuses. 115 The review of corporate
connections to human rights violations in Burma reveals that there are
several degrees of complicity, as shown in the following chart.
The review of company involvement with human rights violations in
Part N-B does not identify any foreign companies that direcdy participate in violating human rights. However, there are many companies
that direcdy benefit from violations of human rights. For example,
Totalfina and Unocal are companies that have direcdy benefited from

112. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 17, entered into farce
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,616, providing:

1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related
to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons
so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures
shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory
conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected
with the conflict.

See also ICCPR, supra note 111, art. 12.1 ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.")
and art. 17.1 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence.); VDHR, supra note 111, arts. 12 and 17.
113. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, entered into farce Jan. 10, 1957,
320 U.N.T.S. 291, ratified May 14, 1991 (by the United States); Convention Concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labor, May 1, 1932, 39 U.N.T.S. 55. See alsolCCPR, supra note ll1, art. 8(3)(a) ("No
one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.").
114. See Chart, Potential Reach of Primary Investment & Procurement Measures, infra Part
IV-B-2.

115. !d.

134

[Vol. 32

LOCAL OPTIONS AFFER CROSBY v. NFFC

Levels of Corporate Complicity
in Violation of Human Rights
l.e•·cl of' Complicity:

ludude1 Compcmit'' that:

1. Participate
in violating human rights.

a. Operate apparel sweatshops that repress labor rights.
b. Use forced labor to build hotels or industrial parks/facilities.
c. Use forced labor to harvest or transport logs or crops.

2. Directly benefit

a. Purchase/resell apparel made in sweatshops.
b. Purchase/resell logs or crops harvested or transported with forced
labor.
c. Occupy or manage facilities or industrial parks built with forced
labor.
d. Invest in or provide financial services to projects built with forced
labor or projects on land cleared by forced relocation.
f. Sell construction services, equipment or transportation used in
projects built with forced labor or projects on land cleared by
forced relocation.
f. Contract for security services that use forced labor, use forced
relocation or commit violence against civilians.

from violating human
rights.

3. Indirectly benefit
from violating human
rights.

a. License trademarks to companies that buy sweatshop apparel.
b. Provide equity, financing or services to industries/ministries that
benefit from forced labor.

the government's use of forced labor to build and police a gas pipeline. 116 Most of the examples in Part 111-B fall into this "directly benefit"
definition. An example of a company that "indirectly benefits" might
be Suzuki, which provides equity value and financing as ajoint-venture
partner with the military government in order to operate a manufacturing facility in Burma. 117
Using definitions of human rights and complicity, the syntax of
"primary" procurement legislation might follow this model: The government must not purchase goods or services from a company that:
(a) participates in, or benefits from, violation of
(b) internationally recognized labor rights of association, freedom
from forced relocation, and freedom from forced labor.
The definition of either complicity or human rights could be scaled
back in order to further reduce the risk of preemption, the scope of
political opposition, or the administrative complexity of the procurement policy. For example:
• The degree of corporate complicity could cover only companies that
directly benefit ·from violation of human rights. An indirect benefit
test would encompass so many companies that have economic ties to

116. See infra Part IV-B-2.
117. See infra notes 288-90.
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the government that it would approach the scope of a secondary
boycott, both conceptually and numerically. A "direct benefit" test is
probably necessary to make a clean distinction between primary and
secondary complicity in violation of human rights.
• The human rights element could be narrowed to
cover only companies that benefit from violations of
freedom from forced labor, rather than a broader
scope of core labor standards.
To reduce the risk of preemption, legislation could also be tailored
to narrow the scope of companies that would be affected by the policy.
For example:
• The policy could exempt products or services from countries that
are members of the WTO procurement agreement, which would
avoid the conflicts that the European Union andjapan raised over
the Massachusetts Burma law. Alternatively, the policy could be
limited to the local level of government, which is not covered by
the WTO agreement.
• The scope of affected procurement could be scaled back to cover
only the products or services of a corporation that are within an
economic sector where human rights violations are prevalent.
• To narrow the reach of legislation still further, the scope of
affected procurement could be scaled back even further to cover
only those products or services that were actually produced with
the benefit of human rights violations. 118
A "primary" human rights standard for procurement would not be
preempted by the federal Burma law if an affected company and its
conduct have nothing to do with Burma.u 9 If a company's conduct
does link it to Burma, the purpose and scope of the statute would be far
narrower than a secondary boycott, affecting just a few companies
rather than a few hundred.

118. The California legislature recently adopted a "benefit from" standard that applies only
to goods and setvices provided to the state, not to the company with which the state does business.

CAL. PUB. CoNTRAcr CODE§ 6108 (a) (1) (2000) (amended Sept. 28, 2000). It required contractors
to certify that goods and services provided to the state were not produced "with the benefit of
forced labor, convict labor, indentured labor under penal sanction, abusive forms of child labor
or exploitation of children in sweatshop labor." !d.§ 2(a) (I).
119. There could be other federal statutes pertaining to other countries, now or in the
future, that might preempt the application of a procurement policy to companies that benefit
from human rights violations in those countries.
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Would this dramatic narrowing of the purpose and scope save a
primary procurement policy from preemption under the Crosby analysis? An argument that it would not might start with the Court's
observation that the federal Burma sanctions were designed not only to
bar what federal law prohibits, but also to allow what federal law
permits. 120 Thus! a primary procurement policy arguably would prohibit contracts with some companies that trade rather than invest in
Burma, non-U.S. companies, or companies whose investments pre-date
the federal Burma sanctions, all of which Congress intended to permit
(in the opinion of the Supreme Court). 121
In addition, even a narrow primary procurement policy could still
give the European Union, Japan, or other nations cause to complain
that the policy violates the WTO procurement agreement if it results in
states (not local governments) rejecting business from companies that
benefit from violations of human rights. Hence, the problem with
multilateral cooperation still might exist.
Given the subjective nature of obstacle preemption, these preceding
complications could well end a judicial inquiry in favor of preemption.
But this same degree of subjectivity also means that a policy with a
dramatically narrower purpose and scope might withstand obstacle
preemption scrutiny. As the NFTC has acknowledged, even a boycott of
goods made in Burma would be "a very different case" than the one
decided in Crosby, 122 and a primary procurement policy would be much
narrower than that.
The argument that a primary boycott would not be preempted under
Crosby draws support, first, from the Court's own obstacle preemption
analysis, which, as noted above, might leave room for a procurement
policy that dramatically reduces the level of "obstacle" conflict with the
federal Burma law. A law that presents a lower level of conflict is even

120. As noted previously, however, the federal law does not actually state what is intended as
permissible; it only defines what the President may prohibit. See National Foreign Trade Council v.
Crosby, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2298 (2000); see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, § 570(0 (2), 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997). Professor
Lucien Dhooge concludes that "any local procurement scheme that requires the termination of
international business relationships deemed legal by federal law is ripe for preemption. • Dhooge,
supra note 9, at 453. The concept of "deeming" something to be legal for certain purposes on the
state and local level because it is not banned on the federal level goes even further than obstacle
preemption doctrine to make statutory interpretation an exercise in subjective policy judgement
rather than a guideline of interpretation that can be applied consistently through a complex
federal system.
121. See 120 S. Ct. at 2297·98.
122. Oral Argument Transcript at 26, Crosby (No. 99-474).
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more likely to avoid preemption if courts recognize a presumption
against preempting state and local market participation laws.
By its own reckoning, the Court took pains to avoid ruling out a
presumption against preempting state market participation measures.123 Instead, it held that even if there a presumption against
preemption exists, the degree of conflict with the Massachusetts Burma
law was high enough to overcome such a presumption. Accordingly, a
presumption against preempting market participation measures still
may exist if the measures present a lower level of conflict (such as a
primary boycott). There are no less than three justifications for a
presumption against preemption of a primary boycott measure.
The first justification is that a primary boycott is arguably a form of
political activity that is at least favored, if not protected, under the First
Amendment. Like foreign affairs, labor relations is a field of strong
federal interest. Yet in interpreting the ban on secondary labor boycotts
under the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court has
avoided regulating primary boycotts because a broad ban "might
collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment." 124 This does not
mean that primary labor boycotts are immune from regulation, but the
Court has gone to great lengths to distinguish primary from secondary
boycotts, and it has tolerated the incidental economic effects that a
primary product boycott has upon the secondary employers who sell a
boycotted product. 125
A presumption against preempting primary procurement boycotts is
also supported by the Court's holding that political boycotts outside of
the labor context are protected by the First Amendment. 126 Courts
need not find that state and local governments enjoy immunity from
regulation under the First Amendment in order to find that First
Amendment values support a presumption against preempting primary boycotts in the public sector, as long as there is a legitimate public
purpose to justify the boycott. 127

123. 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.8.
124. National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen,
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 62 (1964).
125. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. AUied lnt'~ 456 U.S. 212, 217 n.9 (1982); Gary
Minda, TheLawandMetaphorofBoycott, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 807,843,898 (1993).
126. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see also Missouri v. NOW,
620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
127. See Matthew Porterfield, supra note 7, at 4047. There are at least three published
opinions that support giving First Amendment protection to the activities of state and local
governments. See Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186 (7th Cir. 1996); County of Suffolk v.
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The second justification for a presumption against preemption is
that a primary procurement boycott, which avoids companies that
directly benefit from violations of international law, is arguably entitled
to the deference that courts have traditionally shown to procurement
preferences and ethical standards. It is true that some courts interpret
state competitive bidding statutes narrowly to limit discretion such that
the lowest bidder may be avoided only on grounds that the lowest
bidder is not capable. 128 However, most courts enforce procurement
preferences like minority contractor preferences that are based on
clearly stated "public interests" and interpret "responsible bidder"
requirements to mean that qualified bidders must be socially responsible in addition to being a financially qualified bidder. 129 New Jersey
courts, for example, have defined "responsible bidder" to include a
consideration of moral integrity and have upheld rejection of low
bidders in order to avoiding associating with criminals or with firms
that knowingly associate with criminals. 130
These public standards, which are tantamount to a primary boycott
of unethical business partners, are analogous to private sector sourcing
guidelines such as those of Levi Strauss & Co., which are based on
avoiding business partners that associate with governments that violate
human rights. 131 Actually, private-sector standards function much more
like a secondary boycott than the more limited ethical contracting
standards to which courts routinely defer.
The third justification for a presumption against preemption of a
primary boycott is the relationship of state governments to specific human
rights conventions. As our culture and economy become more global,
international law gains increasing importance in defining universal standards . of public morality. 132 It is common sense that state and local
governments would orient their standards of public welfare and morality
to international consensus on "those benefits deemed essential for indi-

Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Nadel v. Regents of University of
California, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188 (1994).
128. See, e.g., MCM Construction, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44
(1998); Arrington v. Associated General Contractors, 403 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1981).
129. See generaUy 10 McQUil.LIN ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§ 29.73a-To other than lowest
bidder; M. Victoria Wilson, Set-Asides of Local Government Contracts for Minority Oumed Busines.res:
Constitutional and State Law Issues, 17 N.M. L. REv. 337 (1986).
130. See Bodies by Lembo, Inc. v. County of Middlesex, 669 A.2d 254 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1996);
Trap Rock Ind., Inc. v. Kohl, 284 A.2d 161, 166 (NJ. 1971).
131. See Levi Strauss & Co., Global Sourcing and operating Guidelines-Terms of Engagement, at
http://www.levistrauss.com/about/code.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).
132. See Brief of Amici Curiae Non-profit Organizations at 12, Crosby (No. 99-4 74).
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vidual well-being, dignity and fulfillment and ... a common sense of
justice, fairness and decency." 133 With regard to worker rights of association, freedom from forced relocation, and freedom from forced labor,
international commitments have been ratified by the United States. A
primary procurement standard would honor the letter and the spirit of
these federal foreign commitments and thus deserve some deference in
the balancing of interests in obstacle preemption analysis. For example,
the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (No. 105), not
only prohibits forced labor, it commits its signatories to suppress the use of
any form of compulsory labor "for purposes of economic development."134
Equally important for preemption analysis, U.S. state governments
retain delegated discretion in meeting their own obligations under the
international agreements that define worker rights of association and
freedom from forced relocation and forced labor. The forced labor
conventions are implemented under the constitution of the International Labor Organization ("ILO"). The ILO constitution has its own
federalism clause, which means that when the subject of a labor
convention involves state authority as well as federal authority, that
convention is treated like a recommendation to the states and is
"referred to the state[s] for such action as they may care to take,"
including state-level implementation of an ILO convention that is
independent of actions of the national government, even if the national govemment has not ratified the ILO convention. 135
On june 15, 2000, for the first time in its history, the ILO called upon
its members (nation-states, labor unions and employers) to limit their
trade relationships with a country, Burma, in order to suppress the use
of forced labor (beginning on November 30, 2000) .136 The ILO action

133. LoUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 ( 1996); see Peter J. Spiro, The States and International
Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567 (1997).
134. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, supra note 113, at art. I (b).
135. The Constitution of the International Labour Organisation Instru~ent of Amendment,
1946, art. 19. 7, opened for signature Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3485, 3522, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 72; Hearings on
SJ Res. 117 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 84th Con g. 249-50 ( 1956) (statement
of Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Sec. of Labor for Int'l Affairs).
136. The relevant part of the ILO resolution reads as follows:
[The International Labor Conference recommends] to the Organization's constituents
as a whole-governments, employers and workers-that they ... review ... the
relations that they may have with [Burma) and take appropriate measures to ensure
that [Burma] cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the
system of forced or compulsory labour.
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strengthens the position ofiLO-member nations and their sub-national
units of government against future arguments that withdrawal from
trade with Burma in the context of forced labor somehow violates
international trade obligations. In general, ILO action establishes a
more favorable context for future court review of procurement standards that seek to avoid businesses that have a direct or "primary"
connection to ventures that perpetuate a system of forced labor.
An even more explicit delegation of discretion to state governments
is contained in the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, which defines worker rights of association and human rights to
freedom from forced relocation and forced labor. The United States
Senate ratified this convention in 19~2, subject to a federalism reservation that states that the United States government must implement the
convention "to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial
jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention and otherwise by
the state and local governments. " 137

The Senate's deference to state sovereignty is consistent with the
Supreme Court's more recent development of a constitutional principle against singling out state officials and commanding them to
implement federal policy objectives. 138 The Crosby Court may have
ruled out constitutional immunity for the Massachusetts Burma law,
but the Court's reasoning leaves room for a qualified immunity that
applies to less "coercive" forms of state market participation. 139 The

Int'l Labor Conference, 88th Session, Geneva, June I5, 2000, Fourth Report of the Selection
Committee, Resolution 'll I (b). The effective date of the resolution was deferred until November
30, 2000, to enable the government of Burma to take concrete action through legislative,
executive, and administrative measures to suppress the use of forced labor. When the government
of Burma failed to so, the ILO governing body refused to stay implementation of the resolution,
which took effect on November 30, 2000. Press Release, International Labor Organization, ILO
Governing Body opens the way for unprecedented action against forced labor in Myanmar (Nov.
I7, 2000) (on file with author).
I37. I38 CoNG. REc. 4784 (1992) (emphasis added).
I38. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. I44, I49 ( I992) (holding that Congress may not
require states to take title to nuclear waste as an incentive for states to take responsibility for
disposing it); Printz v. United States, 52I U.S. 898, 935 (I997) (holding that Congress may not
direct state officials to conduct background checks in order to implement federal handgun
policy).
I39. Mark Tush net suggests that states might retain some degree of constitutional immunity
for market participation that would protect statues less intrusive than the Massachusetts Burma
law. See Tushnet, supra note I 09. Professor Tushnet offers a primary boycott law as an example that
a state law that might be immune from preemption as well as the reach of the dormant commerce
clause. However, he defines a primary boycott more broadly than the option presented in this
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idea that the federal Burma sanctions should also preempt a narrow
primary boycott sounds much more like interpreting Congressional
intent as mandating "forced commerce" with morally offensive business partners when, in fact, Congress said nothing of the sort. Mark
Tushnet argues that preemption of state procurement preference~
amounts to "conditional commandeering" or "negative commandeering" of state policy, a practice which raises the same federalism concerns that motivated the Supreme Court to strike down federal laws
that affirmatively commandeer state policy. 140
The problem is not only that the CroslJy decision interprets the federal
Bunna law in such a way that it commands state officials to do business
with companies that the state would otherwise avoid on grounds of public
morality. More specifically, the problem is that if read too broadly, the
CroslJy interpretation appears to single out state and local governments and
target them for regulation in a way that is distinct from the way that
Congress regulates private market participants.
In the Burma-law litigation, Massachusetts and its amici drew upon
this non-targeting principle and arguments based on the 1Qth Amendment asserting that states are immune from judicial or congressional
commands that leave them with inferior market participation rights in
comparison to corporations in the private sector. 141 The Supreme
Court did not seriously consider this argument, ostensibly because
Massachusetts had conceded the obvious but different point that
Congress has the power to preempt its Burma law if Congress chooses
to exercise that power. 142
One way to resolve the tension between the Court's federalism
decisions and preemption under Crosby is simply to recognize a
presumption against preemption of state market participation laws
that are consistent with the objectives and practices of private
market participants. With or without such a presumption, it is much
easier to argue that a narrow primary boycott would survive judicial
scrutiny, in part because it is indistinguishable from the routine
behavior of private market participants, including members of the

section. The narrower approach to defining primary boycott in this section strengthens Professor
Tushnet's immunity argument. !d.
140. !d.
141. See Brief for Massachusetts at 30, Crosby (No. 99-494); Brief of Amicus Curiae EarthRights International, National Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, sub 11Q111. National Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2304).
142. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 n.7 (2000).
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NFTC who have chosen to avoid suppliers that exploit the repressive
conditions in Burma. 143
While it opposed the secondary Burma boycott, the Executive Branch
appears to agree that a primary procurement policy focused on specific
sectors or companies does not conflict with the federal Burma sanctions. Long after the federal Burma sanctions were in place and the
NFTC challenge to the Massachusetts Burma law was on appeal, the
President issued an Executive Order barring federal agencies from
purchasing goods produced with forced child labor/ 44 the order was
based upon a broad definition in federal law that bans the import of
goods made with forced child labor. 145 Mter the Crosby decision was
announced, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a list of banned
products made with forced child labor, which listed the products by
country of origin. All eleven products listed are from Burma; one
product is also from Pakistan. 146 This product list is based upon an
Executive Order that is neutral with respect to Burma or any other
country of origin. As such, it shows how a primary boycott policy can be
independent of the federal sanctions on Burma. 147 Like a primary state
procurement policy, this federal policy is designed to serve a moral
policy objective that does not impair the "delicate balance" of the
federal Burma sanctions.

143. See Carlos M. Vasquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 CoLO. L. REv. 1318, 1344-50
(1999). For example, Levi Strauss has sourcing guidelines that enable the company to avoid
suppliers based on the "human rights environment" and the employment practices of potential
business partners including such core labor standards as prohibition on use of child labor,
prison labor, forced labor and discrimination against workers who exercise their rights to organize
or associate with a union. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra note 131.
144. Executive Order 13126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,383 (June 12, 1999).
145. A state or local primary procurement ban would be compatible with the federal import
ban on products made with forced labor, which was passed by Congress that took effect in 1932,
the same year that the ILO Forced Labor Convention entered into force. It prohibits import of
goods "produced or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor
or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor." Tariff Act of 1930, tide III, part I,§ 307, 46 Stat.
689 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994). It defines "forced labor" to include "all
work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its
nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily." The term includes
forced child labor. /d.
146. The complete list of products made with forced or indentured child labor includes:
Bamboo, beans, bricks (hand-made), chilies, com, pineapples, rice, rubber, shrimp (acquaculture),
sugarcane and teak. Request for Comments, Notice of Preliminary List of Products Requiring Federal
Contractor Certification as to Forced or Indentured Child Labor Under Executive Order No. 13,126,
65 Fed. Reg. 54,108, 54,109 (Sept. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Forced Labor Notice].
147. The Forced Labor Notice cites the Tariff Act of 1930 and Department of Labor reports
on suppressing child labor as its legal authority and policy purpose. /d. at 54,109.

a
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To summarize, state or local governments may be able to avoid
preemption under the federal Burma sanctions or other similar sanctions of the local interest can be defined narrowly to affect companies
that benefit from trade in sectors where violations of human rights
predominate. However, this argument is stronger if the local interest is
defined more narrowly to affect companies whose own products or
services directly benefit from violations of human rights. The argument
is stronger still if the local interest can be defined as avoiding business
with such a company but only regarding the specific products that
directly benefit from the violation of human rights.
While these options are promising, a word of caution is in order. The
inherent vagueness of obstacle preemption means that a court might
see an obstacle even in avoidance of a company that directly benefits
from the violation of human rights if the law is challenged by a
company doing business in Burma. If so, a savings clause should work
to limit the effect of any preemption to just companies in Burma. Of
course, the arguments on either side of this option will be theoretical
until they are tried and tested.
Two issues that worked against the Massachusetts Burma law remain:
potential conflict with trade agreements, and duration of the law. Both
of these concerns can be avoided with careful legislative drafting.
As noted above, conflict with the wro procurement agreement is a
problem only at the state level. Local procurement is not covered by
that agreement. The potential for state-level conflict can be avoided by
following the approach of the President's Executive Order, which bans
federal government purchase of products made with forced or indentured child labor. That policy avoids the WfO conflict by simply
exempting products from nations that are signatories to the wro
procurement agreement or NAFfA. 148

148. The Executive Order provides that:
This order does not apply to a contract that is for the procurement of any product, or
any article, material, or supply contained in a product that is mined, produced, or
manufactured in any foreign country if: (1) dte foreign country is a party to the
Agreement on Government Procurement annexed to the WfO Agreement or a party
to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"); and (2) the contract is of a
value that is equal to or greater man me United States mreshold specified in the
Agreement on Government Procurement annexed to the wro Agreement or NAFTA,
whichever is applicable.
Executive Order 13126, § 5(b), supra note 144.
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This exception might be a symbolic loophole, but it sacrifices little of
substance because it affects products from only two dozen countries,
most of which have highly developed economies. Ultimately, it excludes very few products and companies that benefit from the violation
of human rights. 149 For example, the exception does not exclude
products made in Burma, which like most developing countries, has
not joined the wro procurement agreement.
The Supreme Court also objected to the Massachusetts Burma law
because of its permanent status. Even if the President removed federal
sanctions as an incentive or a reward for progress toward democracy in
Burma, the Massachusetts law would have remained in place (unless
repealed). One obvious way to avoid this problem-the simple approach of annually sunsetting a primary procurement policy-would.
be cumbersome and unsuitable to a policy that is not Burma-specific.
There are at least two additional ways to provide flexibility in a
permanent procurement policy, however. One is to authorize a inayor
or governor to suspend application of the law. The other way to
promote flexibility is to make suspension of the law automatic upon the
occurrence of certain circumstances.
Whether suspension is authorized or automatic, the legislation should
provide the guidelines or standards for doing so. For example, the law
could authorize or require suspension of a primary procurement policy
as applied to a company doing business in a particular country, if:
• the President suspends or terminates limits on trade or investment
within that particular country, or
• Congress or the President recommend to state and local governments that they suspend a primary boycott policy as applied to
companies doing business in a particular country.
The idea of linking suspension of state or local measures to a federal
recommendation could introduce a more nuanced and effective relationship between state and federal policies, particularly in the context
of foreign affairs. Neither the alternative of a primary boycott nor a
suspension clause to temper its administration were considered during
the litigation over the Massachusetts Burma law.

149. The most notable problem under such an exception would probably be Mexico. There
are numerous reports that companies harass and intimidate workers who attempt to exercise their
rights to organize under Mexican law. See, e.g., David Bacon, Tijuana Troubles; NAFTA is Failing
Mexican Work=, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 23; William K. Tabb, Turt/i>s, Teamsters, and
Capital's Designs, MoNTIILY REv!EW,july 1, 2000, at 28; Susan Ferriss, Mexico Labur Battle Tests NAFTA
Rules, ATLANrAj. CoNST., Aug. 3, 1998, at 6A; Laura Eggerston, Canadian Labour Backing Mexican
Worker.5, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 7, 1998.
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A suspension provision is not necessary in the sense that the President or federal agencies have the power to "administratively preempt"
state or local law. Administrative preemption requires either exclusive
presidential power or a clear delegation of discretion to the President
or an agency, which exists under the federal Burma sanctions. 150
However, in Crosby, the Court held that the opportunity for an Executive Branch preemption option was not a factor that should weigh
against a finding of obstacle preemption. 151 Suspension provisions
would alleviate the need for federal officials to formally preempt state
or local law.
.
The foregoing analysis provides drafting choices for creating a primary
procurement option that can avoid preemption: purpose, scope, level of
government, and suspension (duration). The result could be a policy that
is dramatically lower-profile than the secondary boycott that the Supreme
Court found to be preempted in Crosby. Its impact on foreign commerce
in Burma could be reasonably characterized as incidental. Still, the subjective nature of the obstacle preemption doctrine means that the risk of
preemption is moderate to high, depending on the scope of the measure.
The least-risky options within this range would be the narrowest (1)
avoiding any procurement business with a company that benefits from
violation of human rights; or more narrowly, (2) avoiding only a specific
product from a specific company when that product benefits from the
violation of human rights.
A full discussion of drafting options for a primary boycott exceeds
the scope of this article because of its technical complexity. However, it
is worth noting some of the approaches that drafters could take. These
include:
• Requiring companies to certify that they do not benefit from
violation of human rights (the scope of which would have to be
defined as noted above) .
• Including respect for human rights as part of the moral or integrity
standards for being a "responsible bidder," which would enable the

150. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210-13, 230 (1942); RoNALD D. ROTUNDA &
JoHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, Substance and Procedure § 12.4, at 220 n.23
(3d ed. 1999) ("When Congress gives an administrator or agency discretion to regulate a field of
commercial activity the agency's decision to preempt should be upheld unless it is clear that
Congress would not have sanctioned a preemption of state authority in the area regulated by the
agency."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 272 (1997); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RElATIONS,§ 115 cmt. e (1987) ("In principle, a United States treaty or
international agreement may also be held to occupy a field and ... supersede State law or policy
even though that law or policy is not necessarily in conflict with the international agreement").
151. SeeCrosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2301 n.24 (2000).
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government purchaser to either select a higher bidder that does
not benefit from violation of human rights or disqualify a bidder as
not responsible.
• Including human rights provisions in an ethics policy for the government and its business partners, the violation of which would enable
the government to terminate or avoid a business relationship.
• Including human rights provisions in a fair competition policy,
which would enable competitors or citizens to challenge a bidder
on grounds that the bidder has an unfair advantage based on
violation of human rights.

B.

Disclosure

An alternative to a primary boycott of companies that benefit from
human rights violations would be a requirement that such companies
disclose the nature of their business if they operate in a sector that is
prone to human rights violations. A company would not be placed at
any disadvantage in bidding for public procurement except for the
requirement to disclose.
If a state or local government can confirm that a company does
benefit from the violation of human rights, this information has several
potential uses. First, the information can underscore the need for a
stronger procurement or investment policy to disassociate from companies that benefit from the violation of human rights. Second, a state or
local government can use the information to petition Congress on the
need for adopting, keeping in place, or changing federal policy with
respect to companies that benefit from the violation of human rights.
Third, simply asking for the information and publicizing it will get the
attention of a company's management.
The NFTC established its standing to challenge the Massachusetts
Burma law by showing the court that at least fifteen companies did
business in Burma and had an interest in bidding for procurement
contracts with Massachusetts. The NFfC asked for and received a
protective order from the court in order the keep the names of these
companies secret, acknowledging that mere disclosure has a power all
its own. 152 Apparently, disclosure alone raises a risk of embarrassment,
consumer boycotts or shareholder resolutions for these companies. 153

152. National Foreign Trade Council's Motion for Protective Order at 1, National Foreign
Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 {D. Mass. 1998) {CANo. 98-CV-10757).
153. /d. at 1-2.
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The NITC's past efforts to protect the identity of its members in
Burma suggest that even a disclosure measure connected to procurement but detached from a secondary boycott would be challenged on
preemption grounds. A disclosure requirement is less "coercive" than a
procurement standard based on how or where a company does business: even if a company does benefit from violation of human rights, it
can still make a procurement contract as long as it discloses the
information. This reduces the risk of preemption slightly, but iffailure
to disclose results in loss of a contract, then preemption arguments
might still be used to challenge disclosure. 154 A cautious approach to.
drafting a disclosure law would be to make it as narrow as a procurement measure would have to be in order to avoid preemption, as noted
in the previous section.
In sum, while disclosure may not be more secure from preemption,
the option is still worth considering because it offers a less coercive
alternative to a primary boycott of companies that benefit from the
violation of human rights.

C.

Divestment

A divestment ordinance would affect portfolio investments, not
the foreign direct investment addressed by Congress in the federal
Burma sanctions. The Supreme Court's decision in Crosby does not
invalidate Burma-divestment laws because the Massachusetts law did
not include portfolio divestment; therefore, the connection between the federal Burma sanctions and portfolio divestment was
simply not an issue. 155 Even if it had been, divestment does not
constitute a secondary boycott, which is what the Court found to
conflict with the sanctions adopted by Congress. It was the "coercive" force of a secondary boycott that the Court found to conflict
with the federal sanctions, in part because it sanctioned trade that
Congress did not prohibit, and in part because it allegedly conflicted with the procurement agreement of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").

154. In Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. et al. v. Quakcenbush, No. Civ. S-00-0506WBSJFM, 2000
WL 777978 (E.D. Cal. 2000), the California Insurance Commissioner threatened that failure to
disclose information related to the insurance policies of Holocaust survivors would result in loss of
several companies' licenses to sell insurance in California. The Federal District Court granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute on foreign affairs and foreign Commerce Clause grounds. ld. at 10, 13.
155. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 29, Crosby (No. 99-474) (the Massachusetts case presented "no occasion in this case" to consider the validity of divestment).
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While acknowledging that disassociation from morally tainted
companies is a legitimate objective, 156 the NFTC took the position in
Crosby that divestment laws are unconstitutional. 157 Presumably, the
NFTC objects to the br:oad scope of divestment from all companies
doing business in a specific country, viewing such expansiveness as
an encroachment into foreign affairs and an implicit criticism of a
foreign government. However, a law that divests from all companies
doing business in Burma has no direct economic effect on those
companies, which means it would pose no obstacle to the "delicate
balance" of congressional sanctions or presidential discretion in
implementing those sanctions. Nor does divestment have any bearing on a WTO agreement, which was the source of international
conflict over the Burma law. Additionally, the United States government has not complained, as it did repeatedly about the Massachusetts procurement law, that divestment laws create any problem
under the Burma sanctions or for foreign policy in general. In fact,
it has suggested divestment as a viable state and local nonprocurement option.
While noting that corporations might claim that divestment laws
attempt to "regulate," the United States agreed that divestment would
not have as direct an effect as a regulation, because "stock divested by a
pension could still be purchased by someone else, and the transaction
would not be directly linked to any conduct by the purchaser, the
company, or the foreign government." 158
The low economic impact of divestment makes it virtually a symbolic
act of economic speech. 159 Symbolic speech of this nature might be
resented by a foreign government or a corporation from which a city or
state seeks to disassociate itself. However, to stretch Crosby's "purpose
and effect" reasoning to reach divestment would ignore the fact that
divestment has no direct economic effect. It would also ignore the
purpose of divestment, which is to reject the intimacy of ownership of a
morally tainted company, as compared with avoiding trade with a
company.
The most persuasive reasons to balk at wholesale divestment are not
legal; they are administrative and tactical. For example, a law that
requires divestment from all companies doing business in Burma

156. See Oral Argument Transcript at 27, Crosby (No. 99-474).
157. !d. at 22 ("we think the divestiture laws are unconstitutional, but we recognize they're
quite different [from selective purchasing]").
158. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 28-29, Crosby (No. 99-474).
159. See infra Part III-E.
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would be a one-time symbolic event, and then the city or state will be
out of the game as an investor. The alternative would be to sell the stock
of a narrow class of companies that benefit from the violation of human
rights. These could be companies within a sector, such as oil and gas
pipelines in a country like Burma. Alternatively, a city or state could sell
stock selected from a list of specific companies.
A narrower approach to divestment preserves the option of future
divestment, and thus may carry equal or greater symbolic weight than a
one-time event. The message is also more direct. Rather than trying to
focus on a large number of companies that support the military
government by doing business in Burma, the narrower approach can
focus attention on co~panies that are themselves connected to human
rights violations. This is a more cost-effective approach as well. Compared to divestment from all companies that do business in Burma,
divestment from a narrower class of companies enables pension fund
managers to undertake fewer transactions, make fewer inquires of
individual companies, and reduce the cost of implementing divestment.160

160. Concerns over the cost of divestment to pension fund beneficiaries have been addressed
in the context of divestment from South Africa. There are two levels of concern, one being the
transaction costs of divestment, and the other being the effect of divestment on risk and rate of
return. Both concerns were raised in the challenge against Baltimore's divestment ordinance,
Board of Trustees v. Mayor& City Council ofBait., 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), ccrt. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990).
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's judgement that the costs of
divestment were de minimus when viewed in relation to the system's total assets." /d. at 737 n.36.
The annual divestment cost was estimated at between 1/10th and 1/20th of one percent of fund
assets. The percentage was this low even though the Baltimore ordinance required divestment of
47% of the fund's equity holdings. /d. at 726-27. Divestment costs are likely to be significantly less
for Burma than for South Africa because fewer foreign companies do business in Burma than did
business in South Africa in the early 1980s.
The Maryland court rejected the argument that divestment would imprudently reduce the
universe of eligible investments needed to maintain portfolio diversity by noting that economically competitive substitutes remained available. !d. at 735. Nor did a morally based policy for
divestment conflict with the trustees' duty of loyalty to beneficiaries of the fund. The court
explained that the fiduciary standard is not to "maximize the retum on investments but rather to
secure a just' or 'reasonable' return while avoiding undue risk." /d. at 737. The court concluded
that it is appropriate for fund managers to avoid investments that are morally offensive to the
community: "by investing in business with 'a proper sense of social obligation,' they will in the long
run best serve the beneficiaries' interests and most effectively secure the provision of future
benefits." /d. at 738.
While the Maryland court had little trouble accepting the divestment ordinance on fiduciary
grounds, it stressed repeatedly that tl1e ordinance protected the interests of pension beneficiaries
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While divestment from all companies doing business in Burma poses
a low risk of preemption, divestment from a much narrower class of
companies that benefit from human rights violations reduces that
minimal risk is even further. 161
Regardless of how the legal scope of divestment is defined, however,
a reviewing court will probably respect a decision to divest because of
the complexity and fiduciary judgement involved in that decision. 162
When considering divestment from South Mrica, local legislatures and
pension fund managers based their decisions on both the moral
considerations and the investment risks presented by investing in
companies that are prone to consumer boycotts, or that invest in
countries where repression could eventually spark civil strife or revolution. 163 The managers of a public pension fund may not need a
legislative mandate; they may choose to divest from a company doing
business in Burma based solely on their risk analyses. This is exactly the
tack taken by the nation's largest public pension fund, the California
Public Employees Retirement Fund (CalPERS), when it recently announced a policy of avoiding unnecessary risk by avoiding stock companies that trade or invest in unstable and undemocratic nations. 164
Simply put, moral and prudential considerations intertwine, and the
exercise of fiduciary judgment to divest from companies doing business
in Burma is in no way an obstacle to congressional policy objectives.
There are some drafting considerations worth noting for any divestment option. One is to recognize that "divestment" connotes not only
disassociating from corporations in which stock is already owned, but
also that the policy should apply prospectively to future purchases of

by giving fund managers a reasonable period of time for divesunent and the latitude they needed
to manage risks that might arise due to market fluctuations. !d. at 736.
161. Minneapolis and Los Angeles were the first cities to enact divesunent measures after the
Crosby decision. The Minneapolis resolution prohibited new invesunent and retention of investments in companies that engage in "the economic development of resources located in Burma."
City Council of Minneapolis Res.§ 1, Oct. 10, 2000 (enacted Oct. 13, 2000); see Rochelle Olson,
Panel Approves Latest Myanmar Divestiture Resolution, STAR-TRIB, Oct. 11, 2000, at 5B. The resolution
also authorizes divesunent from any company based on invesunent risk. City Council of Minneapolis Res. § 2. The Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to adopt a recommendation to
managers of the city's pension funds to sell the stock of all companies that invest in Burma. Press
Release, Burma Forum-Los Angeles, L.A. City Council Votes Unanimously to Sell Burma-Related
Stock (on file with author).
162. See Robert Collier, Pension Fund Tightens Foreign Stock Rules, CalPERS Board Gives Weight to
Human Rights, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2000; Tribe, supra note 8, at 23,291-92.
163. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 26.
164. See Tribe, supra note 8, at 23,292 ("no prudent investor could fail to see the economic
implications of investing in a country undergoing a profound political and social upheaval").
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stock as well. Another drafting consideration is that local governments
may not have the authority to set policy for the public pension funds in
which their employees participate. This is important because most of
the Burma laws were adopted at the city or county level. These
jurisdictions can still act on divestment policies, but they must do so in
the form of a resolution that advises the pension fund managers, state
legislature, or other body with legal authority to change investment
practices. This complicates the task because success may depend on
persuading other cities and counties to adopt the resolution in order to
accomplish a change in state-level policy. The result may be well-worth
the greater effort, however, because state pension funds have so much
greater visibility and clout in the stock markets.

D.

Shareholder Resolutions

Investor initiatives, such as shareholder resolutions, are not an
economic transaction. Rather, they are pure speech between an investor (possibly a government investor) and the company in which that
investor holds stock. Nonetheless, the NITC has speculated that mere
state government expression of views critical of a foreign government
may be unconstitutional. 165 This is presumably' because the NITC has
argued that under Zschernig v. Miller, city or state criticism of a foreign
government creates a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" to the United States. 166 Zschernig's constitutional preemption of
"embarrassing" local statements may be used as an analogy to support a
statutory preemption claim. Under the Crosby preemption analysis, any
"speech" made by a city or state that is critical of a foreign government
would compromise the capacity of the President to speak for the
United States in developing a unified Burma policy. 167
As noted in the context of divestment, however, Zschernig does not
hold that critical speech alone encroaches on federal foreign affairs
power. Nor does the U.S. Government oppose speech by state or local
officials that is critical of a foreign government because its impact on

165. Oral Argument Transcript at 22, 26, Crosby (No. 99-474).
166. This constitutional assertion is addressed in the following section. Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968); Brief of National Foreign Trade Council at 27, Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474).
167. SeeCrosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2299 (2000). This analogy
is superficial at best because the actions by Oregon probate courts at issue in Zschemig involved
more than political speech. The risk of embarrassment in Zschemigwas created when local courts
undertook their own investigations into the "democracy quotient" of communist governments,
including direct contact with officials in those governments. See 389 U.S. at 433-34.
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foreign affairs is merely "indirect or incidental." 168 Moreover, Justice
Souter himself suggested that state and local governments should be
able to "express themselves, to express their views ... so long as they do
not go beyond the point of verbalizing [condemnation of] the regime
in Burma and, indeed, those who do business with it.... " 169 In sum,
courts are unlikely to conclude that investor initiatives fall within the
scope of the federal Burma sanctions and the findings of Crosby.
However, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") does
set limits on shareholder resolutions. In addition to numerous
technical standards, the SEC 170 allows a company to exclude a
shareholder proposal if it relates to operations that account for less
than five percent of a company's total assets, and less than five
· percent of net earnings and gross sales, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business. 171 The larger a company,
the more likely it can exclude a shareholder resolution with respect
to human rights violations in any particular locale where the company operates. This de minimus rule is likely to exclude the most
direct kind of resolutions that are specific to a location, for example:
(1) a resolution to disclose the nature of a company's business in
Burma, or (2) a resolution that recommends that a company
withdraw from operations in Burma.
In recent years, a number of resolutions have survived the de minimus
rule. A state or local investment policy could require or authorize fund
managers to vote "yes" or even cosponsor resolutions such as the
following:
• Adopt human rights standards. The purpose of the standards would
be (1) to avoid business relationships in countries where all commerce indirectly ~upports repression of human rights, or (2) to
avoid business with particular partners, contractors, or suppliers
that benefit from the violation of human rights or participate in

168. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 36, Crosby (No. 99474) (quoting Zschemig,
389 U.S. at434).
169. Oral Argument Transcript at 12, Crosby (No. 99474).
170. The standards include a SEC requirement that the sponsor of a resolution own stock
that is worth at least $2,000 in market value or I% ofthe company's securities. 17 C.F.R Ch. II,
§ 240.14a-8(b) (2000). In addition, without a company's consent, shareholders have only four
bites at the apple. If a second shareholder proposal deals with "substantially the same subject
matter" as another proposal in the previous five years, then the company may exclude the current
proposal if the first vote was less than three percent. The company may exclude a third proposal if
the second vote was less than six percent. The company may exclude a fourth proposal if the third
vote was less than 10%. § 240.14a-8(b) (2)(ii).
171. § 240.14a-8(i)(5).
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projects or products that were developed or produced with .violation of human rights. As proposed to several companies in recent
years:
the shareholders request the Board to review and develop guidelines for country selection and report these guidelines to shareholders and employees by October [year]. In its review, the Board shall
develop guidelines on maintaining investments or withdrawing
from countries where:
- there is a pattem of ongoing and systematic violation of human
rights;
- a govemment is illegitimate; or
- there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations or legitimately elected representatives for economic sanctions against their country. 172
• Evaluate the cost of business in Burma. The resolution would
require a committee of independent directors to weigh the
benefits of doing business in Burma (or other areas that are
prone to pervasive violation of human rights) against the costs
of risking consumer boycotts, lobbying expenses to oppose
federal, state or local policies, and damage to the company's
reputation and good will. 173
• Provide incentives for ethical management. The resolution would require a committee of independent directors to review ways to link
executive compensation with the Company's ethical and social
performance. 174 _
While shareholder resolutions do not have direct economic consequences, some human rights strategists believe that resolutions are
superior to divestment as a communication and constituency-building
tool. 175 Rather than disassociate shareholders from a morally tainted
company, they engage the shareholders in discussion or debate with
corporate managers and other shareholders. The value of shareholder

172. BAKER HUGHES CoRP., REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1998) (on file with author);
CATERPILLAR CoRP., REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (on file with author); INTERDIGITAL
CoRP., REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (on file with author); UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CoRP.,
REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (on file with author).
173. UNOCAL CoRP., REsoLUTION ON EXECUTIVE CoMPENSATION Uune 2000) (on file with
author).
174. UNOCAL CoRP., REsoLUTION 9N REPoRT OF FuLL CoSTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN BuRMA Uune
1998) (on file with author).
175. See Simon Billenness, Burma Divestment Revisited (Apr. 15, 1997), available at http:/ I
www.freeburmacoalition.org/ old/ divesunent.html.
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resolutions for promoting human rights may come from the substance
of that debate, the risk of wasting the company's good will and appeal
to consumers, the sheer "hassle factor," 176 or most likely a combination
of these factors.
The most persuasive voices for human rights standards in business
will likely be corporations themselves. For example, Levi Strauss (a
member of the NFTC) pulled out of Burma in the early 1990s, citing its
own sourcing guidelines, which provide that:
Levi Strauss & Co. bases its decision on whether to do business
in certain countries based on criteria that include whether:
- Brand image would be adversely affected by a country's
perception or image among our customers and/ or consumers.
- Human rights environment would prevent us from conducting business activities in a manner that is consistent with the
Global Sourcing guidelines and other company policies.
- Political, economic and social environment would threaten
the Company's reputation and/ or commercial interests. 177
What is most striking about this policy is not its idealism, but its focus
on sustainable profitability and the risks posed to the company by
associating with violators of human rights. The policy suggests not only
that repression creates risk of strife or revolution but that consumers
will judge the corporation by the company it keeps.
E.

Political Speech

Political speech options take one of two forms. The first is publication
of the names of companies doing business in Burma, with which the
state or local government must now do business. Unlike the preempted
Massachusetts law, this kind of list cannot be linked to any economic
consequences or it too would be preempted. Rather, the option is
simply to publish information, which requires the publisher to undertake a duty of accuracy. Considering that erroneous information could
have economic consequences, publishing information about companies in Burma also brings the usual concerns about publishers' liability.
The second form of "political speech" is adoption of a stand-alone
resolution or a preamble that accompanies a procurement or invest-

176. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 27.
177. LEvi STRAUSS & Co., GLOBAL SoURCING &
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ment law. It is usually a factual resolution that summarizes human
rights abuses and how governments that violate human rights are
dependent upon foreign trade and investment. An equally important
purpose is to explain how specific economic sectors and corporations
are connected to human rights abuses. The facts are available in
reports of the U.S. Government, the ILO, and the UN, among other
sources. 178
As Justice Souter's recommendation implies, it may be obvious that
this kind of political speech is the least coercive role for state and local
governments offended by the conduct of their business partners in the
private sector. Nonetheless, state and local officials need to be prepared in case the NFTC or one of its members reasserts that it is
unconstitutional for state or local officials to express views critical of a
foreign ·nation.
The NFTC has asserted that political speech can be constitutionally preempted under the foreign affairs power of the federal
government, 179 but the Supreme Court has never adopted this view.
The NFTC's argument ignores the implications of the First Amendment for state and local political speech. 180 Both James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson suggested that the First Amendment limits the
capacity of Congress to regulate the speech of states, just as it limits
the capacity of Congress to regulate the speech of individual citizens.181 The Court has ruled that political speech may not be
restricted simply to avoid offending a foreign government. 182 While
the Supreme Court has not decided whether states have First

178. See infra Part IV.
179. In oral argument before the First Circuit Court of Appeals, Timothy Dyk, counsel for
the NFTC, speculated that "perhaps even a resolution by the state condemning a foreign
government would be preempted by the foreign affairs power." Oral Argument Transcript at 8,
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2304). In oral
argument before the Supreme Court, Dyk faulted selective purchasing laws because they "target a
foreign country" and "communicate disapproval." Oral Argument Transcript at 19, Crosby (No.
99-704).
180. For comprehensive arguments against constitutional preemption under the foreign
affairs power, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae City of Berkeley, Cal., at 1, National Foreign Trade
Council v. Laskey, sub nom. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)
(No. 98-2304); Porterfield, supra note 7.
181. Thomas jefferson and James Madison drafted resolutions for the Kentucky and Virginia
legislatures, respectively, denouncing the restrictions on political expression under the 1789 Alien
and Sedition Acts of Congress as violations of both the First and Tenth Amendments. See
Porterfield, supra note 7, at 26.
182. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down a District of Columbia law banning
signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy). The Court held that regulating a type of speech in
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Amendment rights, it has ruled that the identity of the speaker is not
important when considering the First Amendment as a limit on the
power of Congress to regulate speech. 183 At least four published
opinions of federal and state court have recognized that political
speech by state and local governments is protected by the First
Amendment. 184
Accordingly, state and local officials should feel secure in their
official capacity to speak on issues that affect foreign affairs. The
immediate concern is not what they may say, but what they should say.
As the opponents of "sanctions" rightly observe, the least-attentive
audience is a foreign government that violates human rights to stay in
power. 185 Consistent with that observation, the immediate audience for
political speech is the U.S. public, the Congress, and the Executive
Branch of the federal government. For these audiences, the most
important questions to address in a resolution that accompanies procurement or investment legislation are the following:
• State or local interest. Is there a connection between the participation
of state and local governments in a global market (as investors or
consumers) and either (a) the ability of companies to benefit from
the violation of human rights; or (b) the ability of repressive
governments to draw financial resources from foreign trade and
investment? If so, then it is important to state the purpose of a local
procurement or investment measure in terms of disassociating the
government from companies that are connected to the violation of
human rights?
• Federal-state relations. Is there a need for Congress or the Execu-

order to minimize its "secondary impact" on foreign governments is still a content-based
restriction, which triggers strict scrutiny. !d. at 334.
183. See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 ( 1978). When political speech
is involved, the Court has recognized the free speech rights of various organizational entities,
including regulated private utilities, for-profit corporations, non-profit corporations and political
parties. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (ruling that
California may not require a privately-Qwned utility to include in its billing envelopes the speech of
third parties with which the utility disagrees); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767, 797 (concluding that the
First Amendment rights of for-profit corporation could not be limited to issues materially
affecting its business, property, or assets); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,428-29 (1963) (holding
that the NAACP, even as a non-profit corporation, engages in activities meriting First Amendment
protection); San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. March Fong Eu, 826 F.2d 814,
825-26 (9th Cir. 1987), affd489 U.S. 214 (1989) (establishing First Amendment rights for political
parties).
184. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 34.
185. See, e.g., Dan Griswold, Trade Sanctions & Selective Purchasing Laws, BURMA DEBATE,
Summer 1999, at 12-13, 15.
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tive Branch to show greater deference to the exercise of legislative or market- participation power at the state and local level?
State and local governments that have been preempted may
want to petition Congress to authorize (or reauthorize) their
exercise of selective purchasing power. However, before making
such a request, state and local officials should remember the
importance of politically astute timing. A petition to Congress tp
restore local authority could backfire unless it first takes into
account (a) the foreign affairs climate of the day, and (b)
Congress's tendency to take no action on a petition unless the
timing is right and the petition is part of a well-orchestrated
lobbying campaign.
• Federal fareign policy. Is there a need to adopt, keep in place, or
change a particular kind of national policy?
Another important audience is the market in which a state or
local government is a participant. This market includes the corporations that benefit from violations of human rights as well as their
consumers and investors. With this audience, a resolution can state
the local interest as noted above, as well as address the following
questions:
• Consumer and investar relations. How can consumers and investors
hold corporations accountable for violating standards of public
morality? The law introduced by the resolution is one way to do so,
but participation by other market actors is necessary for corporate
accountability.
• Corparate human rights standards. How can corporations assure their
consumers and investors that they will not exploit repression as a
market opportunity? A resolution can explain the history and use
of human rights standards, which corporations can adopt individually or collectively.
Whether the audience is Congress and the public or corporations
and their consumers, the political speech component of state and local
policy communicates the importance of economic advocacy in a global
economy.
IV.

ECONOMIC ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The corporate campaign against the Burma law has always been
reinforced by the political argument that selective purchasing and
other forms of economic advocacy are "sanctions" that do not work. 186

186. !d.
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"Not working" has been defined in terms of the futility of persuading
dictators to give up power. For example, the military government of
Burma has little to do with the U.S. economy and cares little about
public opinion anywhere. 187
The free-Burma campaign also understands the isolationist character of the military government, perhaps as well as the junta's business
partners. Not surprisingly, the view of "what works" for a human rights
campaign is more from the bottom-up than from a top-down perspective. From the bottom-up perspective, influencing the generals in
Rangoon is indeed an objective, but it is the least of five functions of
procurement policy or other forms of economic advocacy. The five
functions follow a natural sequence in building a grassroots campaign
into an international movement. They include:
• defining human rights standards for market participation;
• targeting violations of those standards;
• building a constituency for human rights;
• creating a laboratory for national policy; and
• influencing foreign affairs.
Human rights advocates can evaluate the policy options discussed
above in terms of whether the options enable them to fulfill these
functions of economic advocacy for human rights. This is not to say that
the process or means are more important than the policy result, which
is to create economic incentives for corporations and governments to
implement human rights. Rather, the point is that the process/means
and the policy/ends are symbiotic. You cannot organize without a
viable policy goal, and you cannot change policy without an organized
base of support.
A.

Defining Human Rights Standards for Market Participation

The first function of economic advocacy measures is the most
obvious: they define human rights standards for market participation.
Most immediately, they determine the companies with which a government will do business or in which a public investment manager will own
stock.
Human rights standards for market participation can be classified in
terms of whether they seek to avoid support for a repressive government or whether they seek to avoid association with individual companies:

187. /dat 1&-18.
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• Avoiding support for repressive governments. In addition to the Burma
and South Mrica boycotts, there have been proposals for procurement or divestment campaigns related to Nigeria, 188 Cuba, 189
Indonesia, 190 and Tibet. 191 The lack of success in building the
latter campaigns can be attributed to how difficult it is to amass the
financial, human, and organizational resources that it takes to
mount an international campaign. It also indicates the heavy
burden of proof that advocates must meet in order to make the
political case that violations of human rights are so endemic to the
political and economic system that merely doing business in the
country necessarily provides economic support that perpetuates
the repression. 192 This standard can be narrowed somewhat by
focusing on delivery of financial services to a repressive governmene93 or by focusing on strategic industries (such as oil, other
extraction industries and electric power generation) that are directly owned or controlled by the repressive government in order
to maximize its foreign exchange and revenue. 194
• Avoiding association with individual companies. A human rights standard can be defined as a boycott of goods that are produced in
violation of a specific human right based on international law. For
example, California amended its procurement code in September
of 2000 to ban state agencies from purchasing goods made with the

188. The jurisdictions include Alameda County, CA; Amherst, MA; Berkeley, CA; and
Oakland, CA. IRRC REPORT 1998, supra note 19, app. F (char).
189. See Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (S.D. Fla.
2000). As noted above, the Miami-Dade resolution was partly enjoined as an unconstitutional
encroachment on the federal foreign affairs power and preempted by the federal sanctions on
Cuba. See id. at 1181.
190. Bills were proposed in a number of jurisdictions but not adopted. See, e.g., H.B. 3177,
18lst Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999).
191. Free-Tibet activists have promoted self-detennination for Tibet and condemned Chinese occupation of Tibet through non-binding "Tibet Support Resolutions" that have been
adopted in 2 states and 13 cities as of May 2000. The states include Massachusetts and New Mexico.
The cities include Amherst, MA; Atlanta, GA; Berkeley, CA; Indianapolis, IN; Los Angeles, CA;
Madison, WI; Miami, FL; Middletown, CT; New Paltz, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Princeton, NJ; Santa
Cruz, CA; and Tucson, AZ. United States SufJrerM Courl to Rule on Selective Purchasing, TIBET BRIEF
(Int'l Comm. of Law. for Tibet, Berkeley, Cal.), Spring/Summer 2000, at 13.
192. There are other important reasons why the burden of persuasion is high, including the
risk of retaliation to U.S. companies (as in the case of China) and the quickly changing nature of
events in the foreign country (as in the case of Nigeria).
193. See, e.g., H.B. 1273, 413th Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999) (proposing, but failing to enact, a bill for
Nigeria).
194. /d.
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benefit of forced labor. 195 A somewhat broader approach would be
to boycott companies (not just individual products) that violate
specific human rights or that directly benefit from exploitation of
human rights. For example, four jurisdictions recently threatened
to boycott Swiss banks because they benefitted from withholding
assets from the families of Holocaust survivors and (at the time)
refused to make what the families considered to be adequate
compensation. 196 Another way to define a class of companies is to
incorporate a corporate code of conduct by which companies can
make a public commitment to honor human rights in the countries where they do business. For example, at least fifteen jurisdictions have a purchasing or investment preference for companies
that subscribe to the MacBride principles for employers to avoid
religious discrimination in Northern Ireland. 197
• As the litigation over the Burma law reveals, defining the scope
of a human rights standard is a crucial political judgment. A
broad definition will hit the target, but it will also include a large
number of powerful market participants that may object to the
standard and attack it in legislatures and courts. Human rights
advocates are likely to be more risk-averse after the Crosby
decision. If they choose an option that has a high risk of being
overturned in court, they ris~ losing political credibility with
public officials as well as wasting their time and resources.
However, if they are too risk averse, they may miss an opportunity to retake and defend the middle ground. Whether that
middle ground is worth defending depends upon the value that
potential procurement or investment options add to the other
functions of economic advocacy, which are addressed below.

195. CAL. PuB. CoNr. CoDE§ 6108 (Deering 2000 Supp.).
196. The threatened boycott produced an almost immediate response by the banks, which
led to a settlement of claims. The public officials involved in this effort included the comptroller
of the City of New York and the state treasurers of California, New York and Pennsylvania. See John
Zarcorostas, Bern Withdraws Threat UIJer Holocaust claims, J. CoM., July 8, 1998, 3A; John Goshko,
Swiss Banks' Pact Ends NY Threat of Sanctions, WASH. Posr, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al4; John Goshko,
Sanctions on Swiss Banks to Proceed, WASH. Posr,July 2, 1998, at A3; David Sanger, How a Swiss Bank
Goat ld Deal Eluded a U.S. Mediator, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1998, at A6; Henry Weinstein & John
Goldman, Nazi-Em Claims Spark Sanctions on Swiss Banks, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at Al.
197. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 32, § 23(1)(d) (iii) (West 1998). The other 12
jurisdictions include Albany, NY; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH; Lakewood, OH; New
York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Renssalear City, NY; Rochester, NY; San Francisco, CA; Scranton, PA;
and Yonkers, NY.
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B.

Targeting Violations of Human Rights

From an organizing and media perspective, the level of conflict that
surrounded the Massachusetts selective purchasing law was desirable.198 This is not to say that generating media coverage was the
objective in choosing a controversial legislative standard, but it was
certainly one tangible outcome of the strategy. Both the process of
campaigning to enact selective purchasing laws and the process of
defending those laws against legal attack enabled human rights advocates to communicate their message to millions of people. According
to Simon Billenness, a strategist in the free-Burma campaign, the
litigation "expanded public awareness of the human rights violations in
Burma and how we as consumers, as investors, can use our freedom in
the marketplace to effect political and social change. 199 Of course, the
publicity value of litigation does not justify starting or provoking
litigation that would risk losing important economic policies. However,
once the batde is joined, the Burma law litigation proves that even a
losing cause can generate opportunities for public education.
Would purchasing or investment measures that stop short of a
country-specific boycott enable human rights advocates to publicize
violations of human rights? The alternative would be for private actors
to disclose violations to the media or to promote company boycotts
without any connection to public policy. By comparison, linking the
same actions to a public procurement or public investment policy
brings several advantages. First, it turns a distant human rights issue
into a local issue that connects to the moral grounding of taxpayers and
pension fund investors. Second, the passage of a controversial law and
the likelihood of conflict over that law make news. Third, the focus on
an individual company can still illustrate the violation of human rights
by the government of a country.
The way to illustrate the value that middle-ground options bring to a
campaign is to first summarize the nature of human rights violations by
the Burmese government as a case study and then ask whether the
presence of specific companies is direct enough to engage the companyspecific policies being considered. The examples below presume that
the alternative to a secondary boycott of all companies in Burma is

198. A Lexis News search on the terms "Massachusetts," "Burma" and "National Foreign
Trade Council" since the date on which the NITC filed its complaint against the Massachusetts law
(April 30, 1998) shows that there have been over 300 media stories on the litigation or relating the
case to the human rights violations in Burma.
199. Goldberg, supra note 14.
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either a primary boycott of companies that directly benefit from
violations of human rights in Burma or non-procurement options such
as divestment or shareholder resolutions that aim to change corporate
behavior.
1.

Violation of Human Rights by the Government of Burma

The "foreign policy" objective of both state and federal Burma laws
was the restoration of democracy. Mter the government of Burma lost
eighty-two percent of the seats in Parliament in 1990 to the National
League for Democracy ("NLD"), the government repudiated the election.200 The junta-the State Law and Order Council ("SLORC")wages a war of attrition against the NLD. Its goal is to "annihilate" the
NLD by imprisoning, harassing, economically coercing, and isolating
NLD leaders. 201 Recently, the SLORC dropped all pretense of tolerating an opposition party when it blockaded attempts by Aung San Suu
Kyi to travel outside of Rangoon, placed her and the entire NLD
leadership under effective detention, raided the headquarters of the
NLD, and escalated what various reports describe as an ·endgame to
"finish off" the NLD. 202 A Special Rapporteur for the UN concludes
that the economic suffering of the Burmese people is a result of this
repressive political climate. 203

200. For a capsule history of Burma since World War II, see BriefHistury, BuRMA: CoUNTRY IN
CRISIS (Open Society Institute, New York, N.Y.), 1999, at 1-2 [hereinafter OSI REPORT]; see also
Dhooge, supra note 9, at 390-92.
201. Aung San Suu Kyi, Editorial, Why Burma Must Tall£ Steps to Change, WASH. PoST, july 16,
2000, at B7; Katherine Smyth, supra note 16. The junta now calls itself the State Peace and
Development Council ("SPDC"). However, outside of Burma and throughout this Article, the
junta is referred to as the SLORC.
202. See Berti! Lintner, Tightening the Noose: Rangoon's Military Junta Seems Bent on Finishing off
the Main Opposition Party this Year, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Nov. 16, 2000, at 30; Burma Cracks down on
Pro-Democracy Party, WASH. PoST, Sept. 3, 2000, at A2; Seth Mydans, Burma Leader Forced Home;
StandoffEnds, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 3, 2000, at Al, 9.
203. The UN has reported the scope of repression in Burma as
including the practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced labor,
including forced portering for the military, abuse of women, politically motivated
arrests and detention, forced displacement, serious restrictions on the freedom of
expression and association, and the imposition of oppressive measures directed, in
particular, at ethnic and religious minority groups.
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of special Rapporteurs, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Agenda Item llO(c) 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/466 (1996) [hereinafter Reports of Special
Rapporteurs].
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The SLORC political repression extends to an elaborate system of
economic control. 204 It is not possible for a foreign investor or trader to
do business in Burma without supporting and dealing with the military
government. 205 As recently reported by the National Labor Committee:
Foreign companies are not allowed to operate independently
in Burma, but are required to be in joint ventures with the
military government.... [For example,] apparel and textile
firms in Burma are part-owned and controlled by the Burmese
military government and the military itself. A portion of money
earned from garment exports to the U.S. goes directly to the
regime and is used to purchase weapons from China to repress
the people of Burma. 206
The military government derives financial support from trade not
only from tariffs and taxes, but also profit-sharing from the holding
companies that are owned by the Directorate of Defense Procurement
or by the military's pension fund. 207 Foreign investors and traders can
only move funds through government-owned banks, and Burmese

204. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, National Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, sub nom. National Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsois, 181 F.3d 38 (1" Cir. 1999) (98-2304).
205. Blaine Harden, How to Commit the Perfect Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at WK5;
Blaine Harden, The New Burmese Leisure Class: Anny Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at A3. In
her extensive discussion of economic repression in Burma, Barbara Victor writes:
Without exception, outside investors who do business in Burma-venu~res that range
from real estate to drug trafficking to money laundering-are selected based on their
understanding and agreement that all profits are shared with the SLORC. Although
kickbacks and bribes are not unusual, what is most disturbing is how many foreigners
who represent legitimate enterprises-both Asians and westerners-and who may be
upstanding citizens in their own countries, change drastically when they arrive in
Burma. Somehow, they tend to ignore all the basic tenets of human rights. Instead of
bringing wit them their own code of ethics, they embrace the practices of the SLORC
and pay the Burmese shamefully low wages; frequently tum a blind eye to inhuman
conditions ... and tacitly condone the razing of people's homes and lands to make way
for their companies' industrial projects.
Barbara Victor, THE LADY, AUNG SAN Suu KYI, NOBEL LAUREATE AND BuRMA'S PRISONER 19-20 ( 1998).
206. NAT'L LABOR CoMM., U.S. RETAILERS INCREASE USE OF SWEATSHOPS IN BURMA AS IMPORTS
SoAR 2-3, at http:/ /www.nlcnet.org/burma/burmapress.htm (june 22, 2000) (hereinafter NLC
REPORT).
207. See AM. EMBASSY RANGOON, 1 U.S. 0EP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORT:
BURMA 16 (1997) (hereinafter EMBASSY REPORT).
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citizens must exchange any foreign currency that they receive. 208
According to the U.S. Embassy in Burma, "whenever, since 1988, the
[government of Burma] received large infusions of foreign exchange,
its defense imports increased sharply the following year." 209
It is this economic food chain linking all foreign trade and investment with military repression that Massachusetts sought to avoid by
implementing the secondary boycott. In the words of the Levi-Strauss
Corporation, one of the NFTC members that withdrew from Burma, "it
is not possible to do business in Myanmar without directly supporting
the military government and its pervasive violations of human rights.'mo
Curiously, the strength of this evidence was scarcely acknowledged in
the judicial review of the Massachusetts law. The trial judge only
alluded to the state's moral concerns (which "may well be regarded as
admirable"), 211 while the First Circuit limited its moral inquiry to
dismissive agreement: "There is one matter on which the parties are
agreed: human rights in Burma are deplorable. This case requires no
inquiry into these conditions." 212 It is no doubt easier to dismiss a
moral purpose when that purpose is presented as a pure abstraction,
stripped of all facts and human content.
The links between international trade and repression in Burma go
beyond the financial food chain that sustains a regime seeking to
"annihilate" its democratic opposition. The other links involve government policies that directly violate specific human rights. Addressing
these government policies, rather than avoiding all contact with commercial actors connected to Burma, could serve as the standard for
procurement or investment. Objectionable policies include the repression of labor rights, the forced relocation of Burmese citizens, and the
systemic use offorced labor.
• Repressing labor rights. The AFL-CIO describes Burma as "one of the
most longstanding and egregious violators" of international labor

208. Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations at 19, Natsois (98-2304).
209. 2 EMBASSY REPORT, supra note 207, at 3.
210. Letter from Sabrina johnson, Levi Strauss Corporation, to C.B. Loeb, Franklin Research
& Development (June 22, 1992) (on file with author). This point is supported by the former U.S.
Ambassador to Burma, Burton Levin, who said, "Foreign investment in most countries acts as a
catalyst to promote change, but the Burmese regime is so single-minded that whatever money they
obtain from foreign sources they pour straight into the army while the rest of the country is
collapsing." RAINFoRESr R.EuEF, FREE BURMA-NO PETRo-DollARS FOR SLORC CAMPAIGN 4, at
http:/ /www.biblio.org/ free burma/boycott/ oil/ oil.html.
211. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287,292 (D. Mass. 1998).
212. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natisos, 181 F.3d 38,45 (1st Cir. 1999).

2000]

165

LAW & POliCY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

standards. 213 The ILO has documented systemic violations of ILO
core labor standards on twelve different occasions in the past
nineteen years: the military government recognizes no trade unions,
and its Trade Union Act formally inhibits organizing and restricts
the choice of union officials. In practice, it does not permit
collective bargaining, and workers who attempt to organize or
complain about conditions or wages are reported to the government, which threatens them with arrest. 214 This repression oflabor
rights violates the ILO Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. 215
• Forced relocation. Approximately 1,000,000 farmers and rural villagers have been displaced by the Burmese govemment. 216 About half
have been concentrated in camps without adequate food supplies
or medical care, and there are reports of arrests or shootings of
people who attempt to return to their farms. 217 As a result, many

213. Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations at 16, Natsois (98-2304).
214. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L AFFAIRS, REPORT ON LABOR PRACfiCES IN BURMA
65-70 (1998) [hereinafter DOL REPORT] for a summary of the ILO findings; see also NLC REPORT,
supra note 206, at 3. Burma's Law on the Formation of Associations and Organizations prohibits
formation of a labor federation, so the Burmese Federation of Trade Unions is forced to operate
in exile with the support of international labor organizations. Brief of Amici Curiae American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations at 17, Natsois (98-2304); DOL
REPORT, supra, at 66, fns. 319, 320.
215. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (No. 87), art. 2, Aug. 31, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17.
216. The U.S. Committee for Refugees has estimated that the the total number of displaced
persons within Burma as high as 1,000,000. U.S. CoMM. FOR REFuGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY
2000: COUNTRY REPORT: BuRMA 1 (2000), available at http:/ /www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/
easia_pacific/burma.htm. The Burmese Border Consortium reports a minimum of 600,000
internally displaced persons in the border areas, mainly as a result of forced village relocations,
including between 100,000 and 200,000 in the Karen State, 300,000 in the Shan State, 70,000 in
the Karenni State, and 40,000 in the Mon State. Burmese Border Consortium, Areas in ~ich F(Yfced
Lah(Yf Have Takn Place Since 1996 (map), rep(Yf(ed in NORWEGIAN REFuGEE CoUNCIL, GLOBAL lOP
DATABASE, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN MYANMAR (BURMA), CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF
DISPLACEMENT, POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES, NATIONAL TOTAL FIGURES, available at http://
www.db.idproject.org/Sites.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2000). Reports from the Karen Human
Rights Group are higher than the estimates above, with 300,000 reported in central Shan State,
50,000 in Karenni State, more than 300,000 in Karen State, and many throughout the Tenasserim
Division. KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, AN INDEPENDENT REPORT BY TIIE KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS
GROUP (June 1, 2000), at http:/ /www.ibiblio.org/freeburma.html [hereinafter KHRG REPORT].
See generally AMNESTY INT'L, MYANMAR AITERMATII: THREE YEARS OF DISLOCATION IN TIIE KAYAH STATE
(June 1999) (hereinafter, AMNESTY INT'L REPORT).
217. AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 216, at 3; Burma: Refugees, in OSI REPORT, supra note
200, at 11; U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, 2000 UPDATE ON FORCED LABOR AND FORCED RELOcATION
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people die from easily preventable diseases. 218 Those who flee
from the camps live in primitive conditions in the jungle, or they
attempt to cross military lines to join over 300,000 refugees in
camps on the other side of the borders with Thailand, India and
Bangledesh. 219 There are two motivations for forced relocation in
Burma: the "four cuts" military campaign against armed ethnic
minorities 220 and major economic development projects such as
logging, state farms, urban redevelopment, pipelines, and dams,
which require large amounts ofland to be cleared and secured. 221
The U.S. Department of Labor reports that the practice of forced
relocation "appears to have escalated" since 1988.222
• Forced labor. Burma is building its commercial infrastructure at
gunpoint. In the past decade, the military government has
pressed over 5,000,000 people 223 (approximately 11% of the
population) into forced labor on railroad, highway, airport
runway, agricultural-irrigation system, tourist attraction, and
logging projects. 224 Forced labor accounts for approximately

§ Vl(A)-(B) (2000), at http:/ /www.dol.gov/ilab/public/media/reports/ofr/burma/forced.hun
[hereinafter DOL UPDATE].
218. "Forced relocations place people into life-threatening conditions in relocation centers
... Relocation centers often have inadequate or entirely lack housing, proper sanitation, safe
drinking water, food, and medical care." DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, § Vl(B).
219. AMNEsiY INT'L REPORT, supra note 216, at 4-5; BurtTUJ: Refugees, OSI REPoRT, supra note
200, at 11.
220. The army's "Four Cuts" counter-insurgency strategy entails cutting links of intelligence,
food, money and recruits between the ethnic guerilla forces and the local civilian population. For
example, "In March 1992, 57 villages were ordered to relocate to Pruso and other sites in
northwest Kayah State. As a result, 8000 people moved; dozens of them were reported to have died
from malnutrition in the relocation centres; and others were forced to do work on the AungbanLoikaw railway and perform pottering duties for the military. • AMNEsiY INT'L REPoRT, supra note
214, at 3.
221. DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, §VI; Burma: Refugees, inOSI REPORT, supra note 200, at 12;
U.S. DEP'T OF LABoR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABoR AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF THE 1998 REPORT ON LABoR
PRACTICES IN BURMA§ II (Sept. 1999), at http:/ /www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/ofr/
burma/summary.hun [hereinafter DOL SuMMARY].
222. DOL SUMMARY, supra note 221, § Ill.
223. DOL REPORT, supra note 214, at 35; ILO REPORT, supra note 110, § 262.
224. See, e.g., 1 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGfiTS, AND LABoR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGIITS PRACTICES FOR 1999 987, 1003 (2000) [hereinafter 1999
CoUNTRY REPoRT]; DOL REPoRT, supra note 214, at 31-33; DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, §I; ILO
REPORT§ 528, supra note 110; Measures Taken by the Government of Myanmar Folluwing the &commendations of the Commission ofInquiry Established to Examine its Observance of the Forced Labour Convention
§§ 34-44, ILO Doc. GB274/MYANM (May2l, 1999), at http:/ /www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/gb/docs/gb274/dg-myanm.hun [hereinafter ILO Director's Report]; NAT'L CoALITION Gov'T
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seven percent of Burma's economy. 225 Children and the elderly are commonly forced onto labor teams because village
elders want to avoid sending the adults who are needed to
grow food upon which the village depends for its survival. 226
The penalties for refusing to work include fines, beatings, arrest
and detention. 227 Use or toleration of forced labor violates
the ILO forced labor conventions, which Burma ratified in
1948, 228 and even the Burmese constitution prohibits forced
labor. 229
• Military portering. The most common form of forced labor, military
portering, is not included in the numbers reported above. 230
Portering is most likely to be a violent experience for ethnic
minorities and women, who are separated at night and frequently
raped by soldiers. 231 The U.S. Department of Labor reports that in

OF THE UNION OF BURMA (NCGUB), HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1998-99: BURMA 106-07 (1999)
(hereinafter NCGUB REPORT).
225. DoL REPORT, supra note 214, at 42.
226. fLO Director's Report, supra note 224, § 24.
227. /d.§ I(B). A U.S. State Department report on Burma's human rights violations stated:
[i]n April authorities in Rangoon Division's Htan-Da-Bin Township ordered villagers to
work on a road between Hle-Seik and Kyun Ngu villages; after some villages failed to
appear, the authorities sent a letter to village ward leaders threatening to fine them if
they failed to contribute labor the next day. In May authorities in Rangoon Division
ordered villagers to work on a road from Insein to Nyaung Don or pay a fine of about $1
(300 kyat) per household; police threatened residents with beatings or detention if they
refused and arrested those who did not comply.
1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1003.
228. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (No.l05), supra note 113;
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, supra note 113; DOL REPORT, supra note
214, at 20 & n.59;
229. DoL REPORT, supra note 214, at 23.
230. Military portering is distinct from forced labor in that forced laborers usually return to
their homes at the end of the day, while porters are forced to accompany soldiers on the move for
days or weeks at a time. AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 216, at 7-13.
231. The U.S. State Department found that
[m]any detailed credible reports indicate that in recent years, especially in areas
inhabited chiefly by members of the Chin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan ethnic groups,
army units have greatly increased their use of forced labor for logistical support
purposes, including to build, repair, or maintain army camps and roads, as well as to
plant crops, cut or gather wood or bamboo, cook, clean, launder, weave baskets, fetch
water for army units-and, in the case of young women, to provide sexual services to
soldiers. The number of reports of this practice has increased since 1997, when the

168

[Vol. 32

LOCAL OPTIONS AFTER CROSBY v. NFTC

numerous cases, portering has involved "the destruction of villages,
torture, rape, maiming and killing of exhausted, sick or wounded
porters, the killing of a non-cooperative village head, and the use
of civilians, including women and children, as mine sweepers and
human shields." 232
All of this evidence of human rights violations by the government
of Burma is no longer relevant to the validity of a secondary boycott
of all companies doing business in Burma; the Court has concluded
that promotion of democracy in Burma through a secondary boycott
is preempted by the federal Burma law. However, as discussed in
Part III above, the Court arguably left room for a "primary" approach that is neutral with respect to doing business in Burma. It is
even more likely that the Court left room for non-procurement
policies such as divestment or support for shareholder resolutions.
There is no shortage of meaningful targets for such investment
policies.
In September of 2000, the Investor Responsibility Research Center
("IRRC") reported that there are still 329 foreign companies doing
business in Burma, 233 73 of them are likely to have a significant number
of shares held by U.S. investors. 234 Of these, fifty-one U.S. parent
companies do business in Burma, including seven with equity ties and
forty-four with non-equity ties. 235
One of the more interesting aspects of the IRRC research is that
many U.S. firms feel a need to report minimal contacts with Burma,
even though their subsidiary engagement in Burma can be very extensive. For example:

junta required regional military commanders to become more self-sufficient logistically.
1999 CouNTRY REPoRT, supra note 224, at 1003; NCGUB Report, supra note 224, at 99 ("Porters are
also exposed to dangerous combat situations. These can include exposure to mines, booby-traps
and ambushes. Soldiers sometimes force the porters to walk ahead of them in areas where mines
or ambushes are suspected in order to minimize the exposure of troops to such dangers.").
232. DOL UPDATE, supra note 214, §IV.
233. INVESTOR REsPONSIBIUIY REsEARCH CTR., MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS IN BURMA (MYANMAR) 6
(Sept. 2000) [hereinafter IRRC REPORT 2000].
234. The count of 73 companies is based on the number of companies that sell their stock on
the New York, American, or Nasdaq stock exchanges. See id.
235. /d.
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• Emerson Electric reported to IRRC that it has a representative trading
agreement with a Rangoon company. 236 Emerson also owns a
100% interest in 176 subsidiaries that do business in Burma. 237
• American Express reported to IRRC that it "maintains no direct
presence in Burma." 238 American Express also owns a 100% interest in 143 subsidiaries, more than a 50% interest in 12 subsidiaries,
and less than a 50% interest in 19 subsidiaries, all of which do
business in Burma. 239
• Caterpillar reported to IRRC that it has two formal sales channels in
Burma, one of which is an Indian company, and one of which is a
Caterpillar subsidiary. 24° Caterpillar also owns a 100% interest in
30 other subsidiaries, more than a 50% interest in 6 subsidiaries,
and less than a 50% interest in 27 subsidiaries, all of which do
business in Burma. 241
• Black & Decker reported to IRRC that it has "no assets, property,
equity or employees in Burma." The company reported that its
sales through a local distributor were on an "exceedingly small
scale." 242 Black & Decker also owns a 100% interest in 31 subsidiaries that do business in Burma. 243
This information should remind policy makers that corporate structures are designed to limit liability, and they can obscure visibility and
accountability as well. Any policy that must look through the corporate
veil of parent companies to examine whether they have simply assigned
their unsavory business relationships to a subsidiary.
2.

Complicity in Violation of Human Rights by Private Companies

A "primary" procurement measure would avoid doing business with
companies that violate human rights themselves or directly benefit
from the violation of human rights. While this narrower approach
might escape obstacle preemption, it also constricts a law's utility as a
tool to promote human rights. Thus, a second review of the human
rights abuses in Burma is necessary in order to explore the extent to
which private companies are more directly connected to the violation

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
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I d. at app. B.

Id.atAII-1.
I d. at app. B.
ld. at AII-2.
I d. at app. B.
Id. at AII-I.
I d. at app. B.
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of human rights. For example, private companies might be involved in
handling Burmese exports that were produced under conditions that
violate human rights.
The paragraphs that follow summarize evidence of the connections
between human rights violations and foreign corporations on two
levels. The first level identifies specific sectors of the Burmese economy
in which corporations are most likely to benefit from violation of
human rights. The second level identifies three types of corporate
connections: (1) U.S. companies still active in those sectors; (2) U.S.
companies that have withdrawn from Burma, but which could return in
the future; and (3) the foreign firms in those sectors that are most likely
to sell stock to U.S. investors or sell goods or services to U.S. consumers.244
• Oil and gas pipelines. Forced labor was used in construction of the
Yadana gas pipeline, which is a joint venture between the military
government's oil and gas enterprise, MOGE, Total S.A., a French
corporation, and Unocal, a U.S. corporation. The ILO has cited
evidence that forced labor was used by the military government to
clear the jungle by hand, grade the pipeline route and build a
service road, build the parallel Ye-Dawei railroad, construct landing pads for helicopters, construct barracks, and provide porters
for troops guarding the pipeline. 245 Mter all this work was done,
Unocal and Total paid workers to lay the pipeline. They sought to
distance their paid work "by the Project" from the vast amount of
forced labor commandeered by the government "on behalf of' the
Project, ofwhich they were aware. 246
• The corporate connection. A group of fourteen villagers
from the Tenasserim region of Burma sued Unocal in
the United States under the federal Alien Tort Claims
Act247 for acts of the military for the benefit of the
pipeline project with Unocal's knowledge and consent. These acts included violation of international

244. Each company is cited with its home country and stock exchange noted in parenthesis.
The stock exchanges counted as most likely to sell to U.S. investors are NYSE, Nasdaq and OTC.
However, U.S. institutions also invest in foreign stock exchanges, particularly larger institutional
investors such as endowments and mutual funds.
245. ILO REPORT, supra note I 10, at§§ 505-509.
246. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, John Doe I v. Unocal
Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2000) (No. CV96-96-6959,John Roe III v. Unocal Corp. (C. D. Cal. 2000) (No. CV
96-6112).
247. 28 U.S.C. § I350 (1994); see William Branigin, Rights Victims in Burma Want a U.S.
Company to Pay, Suit Alleges Army Abuses While Pipeline Was Built, WASH. PoST, Apr. 13, 1999, at Al3.
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human rights including forced labor, forced relocation and other violent acts. 248 The federal trial judge
dismissed the tort claim on grounds that the villagers
had to prove that Unocal "controlled" the military's
abuses or that it "sought" the use of forced labor. 249
However, the court did find that "Unocal knew that
forced labor was being utilized and that the joint
venturers participants benefitted from the practice."2so
Unocal has divested its petroleum sales business in the
United States, which takes it out of the procurement
market. In terms of investment policy, Unocal and its
contractors present visible targets for shareholder
initiatives and, therefore, a potential subject of local
divestment or shareholder accountability measures.
Another important target is Totalfina, Unocal'sjointventure partner in Burma. When Total S.A. acquired
Fina, it became the fourth-largest petroleum company
in the world, controlling 2,400 gas stations in the
United States. 251 Subsidiaries of Halliburton built the
offshore portion of the Yadana gas pipeline, 252 and

248. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, John Doe I (No. CV96-966959),JohnR.oe III (No. CV 96-6112) at 2.
249. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 30, 37, john Doe I (No.
cv 96-6959).
250. !d. at 38. Without deciding the specific claims before trial, the trial court summarized
the evidence against Unocal as demonstrating that

a

Unocal knew that the military had a record of committing human rights abuses; that the
project hired the military to provide security for the Project, a military that forced
villagers to work and entire villages to relocate for the benefit of the Project; that the
military, while forcing villagers to work and relocate, committed numerous acts of
violence; and that Unocal knew or should have known that the military did commit, was
committing, and would continue to commit these tortuous acts.
Id. at 27-28; see Daniel Zwerdling, Bwod and Oil in Burma, AMERICAN RADio WoRKS, trans., (June 12,
2000) at http:/ /www.americanradio-works.org/features/burma/index.html; William Branigin,
Unocal 'Smoking Gun' Alleged, WASH. PoST, May2, 2000, atEl.
251. See Edmund L. Andrews, A French Concoction; Totalfina s Acquisition of Elf May Be Only a
Prelude, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at C1; Takeover Bid Helps Spark. Ro.lly in Europe; TotalFina Targets
Riva~ CHI. TRIB.,July 6, 1999, at C3.
252. A division of Halliburton's Energy Services Group, European Marine Contractors
(EMC), built the 365-kilometer offshore portion of the Yadana pipeline after Halliburton
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have signed an agreement to build a pipeline from
Burma to India. 253 The other U.S. pipeline firms
active in Burma include BJ Services and Smith International, both of which are publicly traded. 254 At least
ten U.S. petroleum firms have withdrawn from Burma
including eight that are publicly traded and two that
sell petroleum products to the public. 255 Including
Totalfina, at least seventeen foreign petroleum-sector
firms are still active in Burma, eight of which are
traded in the United States. 256 At least six foreign

Geophysical Services provided pre-construction services for the pipeline. KENNY BRUNO & JIM
HALLIBURTON'S DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT 9 (EarthRights Int'l Report), Oct. 2000, at
http:/ /www.earthrights.org/Haliburton.pdf [hereinafter EARTIIRIGHTS HALLIBURTON REPORT);
Peter Waldman, A Pipeline Project In Myanmar Puts Cheney in Spotlight, Halliburton's Contract Came as
U.S. Officials Sought to Isolate a Brutal junta, WALL ST.j., Oct. 27, 2000, atAl.
253. /d. at 11; see Wayne Madsen, Cheney at the Helm, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1, 2000, at 21;
Matthew Campbell, Deputy Dick's Posse of Women join Fight, SUNDAY TIMES, July 30, 2000, at
http:/ /www.sunday-t .. pages/sti/2000/07 /30/stifgnusa02005.html; Simon Pia, Oiling the Wheels,
THE SCOTSMAN, Sept. 15, 2000, at 16; Public Information Network, Corporate Profiles Compiled by
George Dufan, available at http:/ /www.endgame.org/dtc/h.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2000).
Halliburton is a corporate board member of the National Foreign Trade Council, and Dick
Cheney, Halliburton's recently departed CEO, has been a leading critic of sanctions. See
Christopher Marquis, Over the Years, Cheney Opposed U.S. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2000, at
A2l.
254. BJ Services Co. (formerly a wholly-owned Baker Hughes subsidiary) and Smith International are both traded on the NYSE. IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at A-I-1 and A-II-6.
255. The 10 U.S. firms that have withdrawn from Burma include: Baker Hughes (USA/
NYSE), ExxonMobil (USA/NYSE), Grant Geophysical (USA/OTC), Marine Drilling (USA/
Nasdaq), McDermott International (USA/NYSE), Murphy Oil (USA/NYSE), Pacific Architects &
Engineers (USA/privately held), Parker Drilling (USA/NYSE), Santa Fe Snyder Corp. (USA/
NYSE), and Texaco (USA/NYSE). SOROS Foundation Network, The Burma Project, at http:
www.soros.org/burma/burmainvestors.html (last modified July 17, 2000) [hereinafter OS/ Caporate List]; seeiRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C; Press Release: Free Burma Coalition, Free
Burma Coalition to Dick Cheney: Get Out ~f Burma (July 31, 2000) (on file with author)
(hereinafter FBC Press Release).
256. The 17 foreign firms that are active in Burma include: Daewoo Corp. (Korea/SEO),
Dominion Bridge Corp. (Canada/Nasdaq), Export Import Bank of Thailand, Hyundai Pipe- a
Hyundai subsidiary (Korea/SEO), Itochu Corp. (Japan/OTC), Kailis Holding (Australia/
unknown), Longreach Gold Oil (Australia/ ASX), Mercantile International Petroleum (Bahamas/
OTC), Mitsubishi (Japan/OTC), Mitsui & Co. Ltd. (Japan/Tokyo), Mitsui Construction Co., Ltd.
(Japan/Tokyo), Nippon Mitsubishi Oil Corp. (Japan/OTC), Petroliam Nasional- Petronas
(Malaysia), PTT Exploration & Production (Thailand/OTC), Pacrim Energy (Australia/
unknown), Premier (UK/OTC) and Totalfina (France/NYSE). EARTIIRIGHTS HALLIBURTON REPORT, supra note 252, at 11; IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C; OS/ Carporate List, supra
note 255.
VALLETIE,
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petroleum firms have withdrawn from Burma, four of
which sell stock in the United States, and two of which
sell products in the United States. 257

• Dams for hydro-power. The military government is "wiping out
the population of areas to be flooded by the Salween dam
project," which is planned for Southern Shan state. Most of this
forced relocation, which destroyed several hundred villages
in twenty-three townships, has already occurred. 258 The government cannot build a project of this size (a dam 188 meters
high and costing three billion dollars) without foreign investment and foreign financial, engineering, and construction serVIces.
• The corporate connection. To date, the companies
providing these services are reported to include
Japanese, Thai, and German corporations. 259 Any
company involved in the project is aware of the
forced relocation of over 300,000 people in the
Shan state and the reliance of Burmese authorities
on forced labor for clearing jungles, building roads
and portering for security forces. There are already
500 troops "protecting" the companies involved in
preparations to build the dam. 260 According to
human rights groups monitoring the project, the
foreign companies avoid contact with local Shan
people, much in the way that Unocal avoided contact with forced labor that paved the way for its

257. The six foreign petroleum-sector firms that have withdrawn from Burma include:
Empire Oil (Australia/privately owned), BP Amoco (UK/NYSE), Petro-Canada (Canada/
CDNX), Royal Dutch Petroleum-Shell (Netherlands/NYSE), Shell Transport & Trading (UK/
NYSE), and Yukong Ltd. (S. Korea/NYSE). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C.
258. Government Repurtedly Moving Villagers to Make Way for Dam Project, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Sept. 11, 2000, at Part 3
259. "For years potential builders and funders have eyed the Salween the same way hungry
wolves might gaze upon a stray Iamb." Richard Humphries, Contruversy Dogs Burma s Salween Dam,
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2000, at 9. According to Ham Yawnghwe of Brussels-based
Euro-Burma, a program funded by the EU, the Japanese government is implicated because it owns
67% of Electric Power and Development Corporation, which has completed a feasibility study for
the dam. Id.
260. Id.
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pipeline construction. 261 At least three U.S. construction firms have withdrawn from Burma (none of
which are publicly traded), and none are reported
as active there now outside of the oil and gas
pipeline sector. 262 At least three foreign construction or construction equipment firms are active in
Burma, two of which sell stock in the United
States. 263

• Transpmtation. Forced labor is commonly used to build transportation infrastructure including roads, 264 airports, 265 and railroads,
which are often large-scale projects involving thousands of forced
laborers. 266
• The cmporate connection. The U.S. Embassy reports that
U.S. firms provide transportation services in Burma. 267
Caterpillar sells and services locomotives for Burma's
railroads. 268 One U.S. delivery company remains in

261. /d. (citing reports from non-governmental monitoring groups, including Salween
Watch, the Shan Herald Agency for News, and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional
Alliance, a Thai environmental organization).
262. The three U.S. firms that have withdrawn from Burma include: Black & Veatch
(USA/privately held), KD Engineering Co. Inc. (USA/privately held), and Pacific Architects &
Engineers Inc. (USA/privately held). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C.
263. The three foreign companies involved with dams and hydro-po~er construction include: Hitachi Construction Machinery Co. Uapan/Tokyo), Hitachi Ltd. Uapan/NYSE) and
Kajima Corp Uapan/OTC). /d. at BI-13, BI-16.
264. Forced labor on roads includes DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, at 5-7.
265. Forced labor was used to construct access roads to the Mandalay international airport
and to extend runways at other airports. 1999 CoUNTRY REPoRT, supra note 224, at 7; DOL REPoRT,
supra note 214, at 36-37.
266. Forced labor on railroads includes the following: "3000-4000 people (men, women,
minors, and the elderly) were forced to work without compensation to rebuild an embankment along the Ye-Tavoy railway road. Almost all of the villagers in Yebyu, Longlon, Thayet
Chaung, and Tavoy townships had to work at the construction sites about 10-15 days every
month from june 1998 until the end of the year." DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, at 8. "[I]n
Saigaing Division over 1000 persons were herded into a 'volunteer labor camp' and forced to
work to build a railroad; at least 17 reportedly died from malaria." 1999 CoUNTRY REPORT,
supra note 224, at 1003.
267. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CoUNTRY CoMMERCIAL GUIDES FY 1999: BURMA ch. I (1998), at
http:/ /www.state.gov/www/about_sta..ides/1999/eastasia/burma99_01.html [hereinafter CoMMERCIAL GUIDE].
268. Myanmar Railways reports that it uses a number of Caterpillar locomotives, and the
military government's rail ministry has sent representatives to several Caterpillar plants in the
United States for training. IRRC REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at AII-2.
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Burma, 269 and two have withdrawn. 270 DHL International, a Belgian parent company that operates a
subsidiary in Burma, does a very large business in the
United States, the most prominent aspect of which is a
venture to create an "international strategic alliance"
with the U.S. Postal Service. 271 Including DHL, at least
ten foreign firms provide transportation services in
Burma, 272 two of which sell stock in the United States.
At least one foreign transportation firm has withdrawn from Burma. 273 A less direct connection is
presented at Yangon Port. There, the government has
licensed one of the world's largest heroin traffickers,
to own and operate port facilities. 274 This comes at a
time when Burma already supplies 60 percent of
heroin seized in the United States, and the amount of
Burmese heroin sold in New York City tripled between
1989 and 1996. 275

• AppareL The military government supports the Burmese apparel
industry by using forced labor to build industrial parks where the
newest factories are located. 276 As noted above, the government

269. The U.S. firm that remains is Indo-China Express (USA/privately held). !d. atAI-1.
270. The two U.S. delivery firms that withdrew from Burma include: Federal Express
(USA/NYSE) and United Parcel SeiVice (USA/NYSE). !d. at app. C; OS! Corpvrate List, supra note
255.
271. IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at BI-6; U.S. Postal SeiVice, Introducing . .. Global
Express Guaranteed, available at http://gxg.smi.com/gxg/index.html (last visited on Nov. 30,
2000).
272. The 10 foreign transportation firms that are active in Burma include: Boustead
Holdings (Malaysia/OTC), C&P Holdings (Singapore/unknown), DHL International (Belgium/
privately held), Export Import Bank of Thailand (Thailand), Malayan Banking (Malaysia/Kuala
Lumpur), F.A Voight (Netherlands/privately held), Hutchinson Whampoa (Hong Kong/OTC),
Italian-Thai Development (Thailand/Thailand), Kelang Port Management (Malaysia/unknown),
and Yusen Air & Sea SeiVice (Japan/unknown). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at BI-4-16,
Bll-14.
273. The foreign transportation firm that withdrew from Burma is Transurb Consultants
(Belgium/unknown). /d. at app. C.
274. Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, People of the opiate: Burma's Dictatorship of Drugs, THE
NATION, Dec. 16, 1996, at 11.
275. ld.
276. 1999 CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1004; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, U.S. IMPORTS
FORCoNSUMPTIONATCuSfOMSVALUEFROM BURMA (MYANMAR) (1999), at http:/ /dataweb.usitc.gov/
scripts/cy_m3.asp (indicating that the two highest-ranked categories account for 80% oftotal U.S.
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threatens to arrest and imprison workers who complain or attempt
to organize in joint-venture factories owned by foreign investors
and state-owned trading companies. The Economist Intelligence
Unit reports that textile workers in Burma now earn some of the
world's lowest wages, approximately five U.S. cents per hour. 277
• The corporate connection. Apparel trade accounts for
eighty percent of U.S. imports from Burma, 278 notwithstanding the fact that several U.S. apparel companies
pulled out of Burma since the early 1990s. 279 However, since the U.S. sanctions on "new investment"
were implemented in 1996, U.S. apparel imports from
Burma have grown dramatically, up 272% between
1995 and 1999 to a level of $340 million per year in
2000. 280 "Made in Myanmar" labels have begun appearing on university-licensed logo apparel in campus
stores, prompting immediate boycotts and removal of
goods. 281 At least thirty apparel companies are report-

imports from Burma). One foreign firm known to operate a garment factory is Daewoo Corp.
(Daewoo's now bankrupt/inreceivership-they might not have the factory anymore). IRRC
REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at Bl-6.
277. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report-Myanmar, Emplcyment, Wa~ & Prices, May
11, 2000, subscription service available at http:db.eiu.com (on file with author).
278. U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 276.
279. For example, the Levi Strauss Company stated that "It is not possible to do business in
Myanmar without directly supporting the military government and its pervasive violations of
human rights. This is not consistent with our own sourcing guidelines." Letter from Sabrina
Johnson, supra note 210. Other apparel companies to leave Burma include Eddie Bauer,]. Crew,
Liz Claiborne, London Fog/Pacific Trails, Macy's, Oshkosh B'Gosh, Ralph Lauren, and Reebok.
IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C; OS/ Corporate List, supra note 255.
280. The brand names found with "Made in Myanmar" labels in early 2000 include Adidas,
ASL, Bugle Boy, Burlington Coat Factory Conway, Dress Bam, Filene's, Jordache, Karl Kani,
Kasper, Kohls, Macy's, Montgomery Ward, Nautica, Perry Ellis, Sports Authority, Warner Bros.,
and Williams-Sonoma. NAT'L LABoR COMM., U.S. RETAILERS INCREASE USE OF SWEATSHOPS IN BURMA
AS IMPORTS SoAR 1-2 (June 22, 2000, New York, N.Y.). As ofjuly 20, 2000, the following companies
responded to the National Labor Committee report by announcing that they would cease future
production in Burma: Adidas, Nautica and Warner Brothers. Correspondence from the respective
companies to Charles Kernaghan, Executive Director of the National Labor Committee (July
2000) (on file with author).
281. Logo apparel made in Burn1a was on sale under theJanSport label at the University of
California - Berkeley. The University of California is on of many schools to join the Worker's
Rights Consortium, which acts as a watchdog to assure that universities to not license their logos
for sale on apparel that is made under sweatshop conditions. See Andrea O'Brien, Activists Angry at
Cal Student Store, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN,. Sept. 21, 2000, at http/ /www.dailycal.org/article.asp?id + 3258. Jansport responded to these reports by authorizing retailers to return Burmese-
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edly sourcing their goods in Burma, 282 at least fifteen
of which are U.S. firms that are publicly traded on
U.S. stock exchanges. At least fourteen apparel firms
have withdrawn from Burma, thirteen of which based
in the United States (and eight of which are publicly
traded) 283 and one of which is a foreign firm. 284
• Manufacturing. Like apparel, manufacturing in Burma most directly benefits from violation of human rights because of the
repression of labor rights. Some firms also benefited from the
in-kind subsidy of cheap land in industrial parks that were cleared
by forced relocation and developed with forced labor. 285 The
Karen Human Rights Group estimates that the national figures on
forced relocation would more than double when urban displacement connected with foreign-owned factories is taken into account.286
• The corporate connection. U.S. exports ha,ve been declining, although the trade in industrial machinery
still accounts for fifty-four percent of U.S. exports to

made apparel to the company, freight-free. Free Burma Coalition, No Sweat Money for the Burmese
&gime! (Oct. 25, 2000), at http:www.freeburmacoalition.org/frames/campaigns/sweatshops/
sweatshops.html.
282. Including the 17 companies identified by the National Labor Committee, the companies reported to source their goods in Burma are Adidas, Bugle Boy, Bradlee's, Burlington Coat
Factory (USA/NYSE), Capital Mercury Shirt Co. (USA/privately held), Cluett Peabody & Co.,
Consolidated Stores (USA/NYSE), Conway, Dress Barn (USA/Nasdaq), Filene's, Gaeltaryn Ltd.
(USA/privately held), Jordache, Karl Kani (USA/privately held), Kasper ASL (USA/Nasdaq),
Kohl's (USA/NYSE), Leslie Fay Companies, Macy's-Federated Department Stores (USA/NYSE),
Montgomery Ward (USA/NYSE), Mothers Work (USA/Nasdaq), Nautica,J.C. Penny, Perry Ellis,
Salmor Import Export Corp. (privately held), Sears (USA/NYSE), Sports Authority (USA/NYSE),
Warner Bros. (USA/NYSE), and Williams-Sonoma (USA/NYSE). IRRC Report 2000, supra note
19, at Ali-2-6; NAT'L LABoR CoMM., supra note 280, at 1-2; OS/ Curporate List, supra note 255.
283. The 13 U.S. apparel firms that withdrew from Burma are Braun's Fashions (USA/
Nasdaq), Columbia Sportswear (USA/Nasdaq),]. Crew (USA/privately held), Kmart (USA/
NYSE), Kellwood (USA/NYSE), Levi Strauss (USA/privately held), Liz Claiborne (USA/NYSE,
London Fog (USA/privately held), Mamiye Brothers (USA/privately held), OshKosh B'Gosh
(USA/NYSE), Polo Ralph Lauren (USA/unknown), Target (USA/NYSE), and Venture Stores
(USA/NYSE). IRRC REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C.
284. The Burton Group (UK/unknown) is the foreign apparel firm that withdrew from
Burma. /d.
285. DOL SUMMARY, supra note 221, §II; DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, §VI.
286. See KHRG REPORT, supra note 216, part IV (estimating a total of 2-4 million internally
displaced persons including uncompensated urban displacees connected with factory construction).
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Burma. 287 Probably the most visible importer to the
United States that operates manufacturing operations in Burma is the Suzuki Motor Corporation,
which opened a Rangoon car and motorcycle plant
in 1998 as a joint venture with the military government.288 At that time General Motors held a 10%
share of Suzuki stock, and in September 2000, GM
doubled its stake when it purchased an additional
$600 million of new Suzuki stock. 289 While Suzuki is
currently the target of a consumer boycott because
of its partnership with the military government, 290
Toyota has withdrawn from Burma. 291 Including
Suzuki, seven foreign manufacturing firms are active in Burma, of which at least three (Daewoo,
Hitachi and Suzuki) sell goods or services in the
United States, and three (Hitachi, Mitsui and Suzuki) sell stock in the United States. 292
• Agriculture. Apart from opium, the U.S. Embassy identifies the
primary agricultural exports from Burma as rubber, aquaculture
shrimp and cash crops. 293 Forced labor, including forced child
labor, has been widely used since 1998 to drain virgin wetlands

287. U.S. INT't. TRADE CoMM'N, U.S. DOMESTIC EXPORTS AT FAS VALUE TO BURMA (MYANMAR)
(1999), at http:/ /dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/c .. TS2&cc=5460&cn=Burma+%28Myanmar%
29.asp (estimating the two highest-ranked categories at 54% oftotal exports to Burma).
288. See]ames B. Treece, Suzuki Sets joint Venture in Myanmar, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 19,
1998, at 17. Suzuki is based in japan (OTC). IRRC Report 2000, supra note 19, at BI-31.
289. Edwina Gibbs, GM to Double Stake in Suzuki, Cement Asia Footing, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Sept.
14, 2000; Trece, supra note 288, at 17. General Motors is based in Detroit, Michigan (NYSE). IRRC
REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at AII-4.
290. See Free Burma Coalition, Protest-Free Burma Coalition, DC Burma Activist Netwurk, and the
Burmese Women's Union, FNS DAYBOOK, Aug. 27, 1999; Free Burma Coalition, Free Burma Coalition
Launches SuzukiBaycott, Japanese Company Prt11Jing Up Narco-Dictatorship in Burma', PR NEWSWIRE,
May 4, 1999, at 12; Steven Greenhouse, A Weapon for Customers; The Baycott Returns, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
26, 2000. § 4. 4.
291. Toyota recently announced its withdrawal from Burma. FBC press release, supra note
246. However, Toyota continues to operate a sezvice center through a subsidiary. IRRC REPoRT
2000, supra note 19, at BI-34.
292. The seven foreign manufacturing firms that are active in Burma include: Ban Hock Hin
Engineering (Singapore/unknown), Daewoo (Korea/SEO), Hitachi Ltd. Gapan/NYSE), MameeDouble Decker (Malaysia/Kuala Lumpur), Mitsui & Co. Ltd. Gapan/OTC), Parekh Platinum
(/India) and Suzuki Gapan/OTC). !d. at BI-3-31.
293. CoMMERCIAL GUIDE, supra note 267, ch. I.
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for crops that the government of Burma describes as export
commodities in its economic plans. 294 For purposes of the U.S.
government procurement ban on products made with forced
labor, the U.S. Department of Labor reports that crops grown in
Burma with forced child labor include beans, chilies, corn,
pineapples, rice and sugarcane. 295 Forced labor is also used to
construct dams and ditches for agricultural irrigation, 296 produce rubber, and raise shrimp in commercial ponds built on the
coast. 297
-• The corporate connection. By far, the fastest growing
category of Burmese imports to the United States is
fish and crustaceans, including shrimp. The rate of
increase in the past year is over 500%. 298 The U.S.
importers of Burmese food products have not been
identified; one U.S. food processor (not publicly
traded) has withdrawn from Burma. 299 At least two
foreign firms are known to have withdrawn from
Burma, one of which sells stock in the United
States. 300

• Logging. Tropical hardwoods including teak are one of Burma's
primary exports, 301 and they are harvested extensively with forced
labor. 302 Because of rapid deforestation in China, India and Thailand, Burma now holds half of the remaining hardwood forest in
mainland SoutheastAsia, 303 including eighty percent of the remain-

294. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1005.
295. Forced Labor Notice, supra note 146, at 54,109.
296. 1999 CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1003.
297. Forced Labor Notice, supra note 146, at 54,109; ILO REPORT, supra note IIO, at§ 504.
298. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 276 (ranking fish and crustacean as the sixthranking U.S. import from Burma).
299. The U.S. food processor that has withdrawn from Burma is Zin International (USA/
privately held). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C.
300. The foreign food processors that have withdrawn from Burma include: Ajinomoto Co.
Qapan/OTC) and Nickerson Group (UK/ privately held). /d.
301. Forced Labor Notice, supra note 146, at 54109; COMMERCIAL GUIDE, supra note 267, at
ch. I.
302. ILO REPORT, supra note 11 at § 504.
303. World Resources Institute: Forest Frontiers Initiative, Logging Burma's Frontier Forests:
Resources and the Regime, at http:/ /www.wri.org/wri/ffi/burma/findings.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2000).
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ing natural teak. 304 Logging in Burma increased dramatically after
1988 (the year that the military government killed thousands of
students to suppress the democracy movement) after the Thai
government stopped issuing logging concessions in order to preserve its remaining forests. 305 By 1991, Burma had the third highest
rate of deforestation in the world at 8,000 square kilometers per
year. 306 Military units conduct large-scale logging, milling, and
related road construction with tens of thousands of forced laborers. For example, one local report explained how people from
several villages were ordered to clear-cut a forest without pay. The
logs were sold commercially, the proceeds shared between two
brigade commanders, and "those who complained got punished
and torture[d)." 307 To indicate the scale of military logging, another report describes two logging projects. For each project,
military forces commandeered 5,000 laborers to work for ten to
fourteen days without providing food or pay. 308
. • The corporate connection. One U.S. furniture manufacturer imports Burmese teak, 309 while three U.S. manufacturers or importers report that they have recently
withdrawn from Burma; two of these are publicly
traded. 310 At least seven foreign firms export or import Burmese teak, and a large number of retailers
sell Scandinavian furniture that is made with Burmese
teak. 311 Since the teak market is increasingly depen-

304. Tim Keating, Farced·Labar Logging in Burma (May 1997), at http:/ /www.enviroweb.org/
rainrelief/reports/teak_tort.html.
305. /d.
306. /d. The extensive deforestation in Burma has become an environmental issue of
international importance because of the resulting soil erosion, sedimentation of rivers, increased
flooding, water shortages during dry season and loss of habitat to many plants and animals. World
Resources Institute: Forest Frontiers Initiative, supra note 303.
307. Keating, supra note 304.
308. /d.
309. The firm is Dean Hardwoods of Wilmington, N.C. (privately held). See IRRC REPORT
2000, supra note 19, atAII-3; OS/ Corpvrate List, supra note 255.
310. The three U.S. firms that withdrew from Burma include: Angelina Hardwood (USA/
privately held), Pier I Imports (USA/NYSE), and Williams Sonoma (USA/NYSE). See IRRC
REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at All-7, app. C.
· 311. The seven active exporters or importers of Burmese timber include: Bollinger Fumiere
(Switzerland/unknown); Dalhoff Larsen & Hronemann (Denmark/Copenhagen); Det Ostasiatiske Kompagni (Denmark/Copenhagen); Earth Industrial (Thailand/unknown); Karl Danzer
Fumeirwerke (Germany/unknown); and Sun (which is supplied by the Sunti Forestry Group of
Thailand/unknown). See id. at BI-4-16. The Scandinavian outlets that sell furniture made with
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dent upon Burmese imports, this sector will remain
the subject of investor initiatives and to a lesser extent,
an issue for government procurement of furniture.
• Tourism travel services. The government of Burma uses forced labor

to develop hotels and rehabilitate tourist attractions such as religious shrines and archeological sites. 312 Considerably more forced
labor has been commandeered to build transportation links specifically to support tourism including the work of 2.3 million workers
for a ring road and restoration projects in Mandalay, 30,000
workers for runway extensions at Bassein airport, a 50-mile road
from Rangoon to Pegu, a highway from Pangoon to Mandalay, and
the clearing oflnlay Lake. 313
• The corporate connection. The government tourism ministry has expanded its marketing strategy from a focus
on Europe to include North America. The ministry
has contracted with Aeroground Group Services, a
San Francisco-based firm, to handle marketing, expositions, trips for tourism operators and writers, and
ticketing services. 314 At least two U.S. transportation
or hotel firms (Marriott International and Silversea
Cruises) are reportedly active in Burma, 315 while two
U.S. companies have withdrawn. 316 At least two foreign cruise companies remain active in Burma. 317 At
least eighteen foreign hotel or resort companies remain active in Burma, three of which sell stock in the

Burmese teak include Dania, Happy Viking, Scan Design, and Scandinavian Design. Rainforest
Relief, Protecting the Continuing oppression of the Burmese People and the Destruction of their Rainforests by
the SLORC, INTERNATIONAL TEAK WEEK OF ACTION, at http:/ /www.enviroweb.org/rainrelief/.
newsnotes/teakweek.htm (last modified Feb. 18, 1998).
312. Forced labor on tourist attractions includes work on Buddhist temples near Rangoon
and the ancientDanoke Pagoda. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1004.
313. DOL REPORT, supra note 214, at 3~37.
314. Myan'flUlr Hires Aeroground to Bring in North Americ~n Tourists, MYANMAR TIMES & Bus. REv.,
Aug. 14, 2000, at http:www.myanmar.com/myanmartimes/no24/ global_touch.htm.
315. The two U.S. tourism-sector firms that are active in Burma include: Marriott International (USA/NYSE) and Silversea Cruises, Ltd. (USA/privately held). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra
note 19, atAII-5-6.
316. The two U.S. tourism firms that withdrew from Burma are Best Western (USA/privately
held) and Northwest Airlines (USA/Nasdaq). Id. at app. C; OS! Cmporate List, supra note 255.
317. The two foreign cruise companies that are active in Burma include: Ocean Cruises Une
(a subsidiary of the Italian finn Costa Crociere/unknown), and Sea Containers, Ltd. (Bermuda/
NYSE). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at Bl-29, BII-3.
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United States. 318 Japan Air Lines ('jAL") not only flies
to Burma, it also trains the crews of Myanmar Airways
International and owns a hotel subsidiary in Burma. 319
Including JAL, there are a total of eight foreign
airlines that serve Burma, three of which sell stock in
the United States. 320
To summarize, the degree of corporate complicity in violation of
human rights is not likely to involve perpetration of crimes, but rather,
direct economic benefit from those crimes, which frequently function
as a type of subsidy. These benefits are knowingly realized through
cheap land, cheap labor, cheap commodities, and market opportunities that open up because many potential competitors have disassociated themselves from participating in such a repressive market. Presumably, most of the approximately 329 parent companies doing business
in Burma do not directly benefit from an illicit in-kind subsidy. 321
However, as the brief survey above indicates, a few score companies are
nonetheless complicit in violations in that they receive the economic
benefits made possible only by abuses of human rights.
The recent upsurge in imports indicates that the adoption of primary procurement or investment standards could be just as important
in discouraging firm's re-entry into Burma as they are in disassociating
from firms that have remained in Burma. The most relevant U.S.
import sectors include apparel, hardwoods, and seafood, while the
export sectors include petroleum services, electronic equipment, construction equipment, engineering and construction services.

318. The 18 foreign hotel firms that are active in Burma include: Accor (France/OTC),
Adman Club Co. (Thailand/unknown), Amara Holdings (Singapore/Singapore), Baiyoke Group
(Thailand/unknown), Bangkok Bank (Thailand/Thailand), Exe Design Qapan/privately held),
Exe Sakura Qapan/privately held) Fidelio Software (Thailand/privately held), Hazama Corp.
Qapan/Tokyo), Hotel Properties (Singapore/Singapore), Idris Hydraulic (Malaysia/Kuala Lumpur), Keppel Corp. (Singapore/OTC), L.P. Holding (Thailand/unknown), Mandarin Oriental
International (Hong Kong/OTC), Myanmar Hotels International (Hong Kong/unknown), Myanmar Swan Investment (Singapore/unknown), Nikken Rentacom Qapan/unknown), and Nikko
Shoji -JAL Trading Qapan/unknown). Id. at BI-1-23.
319. Jd. at BI-15.
320. The eight foreign airlines that serve Burma include: British Airways (UK/NYSE),
Deutsche Lufthanse (Germany/OTC),Japan Airlines Qapan/Nasdaq), M.O. Air System Qapan/
unknown), Malaysian Airlines System (Malaysia/Kuala Lumpur), Pakistan International Airlines
(Pakistan/unknown), Royal Brunei Airlines (Brunei/government-<>wned) and Thai Airways
International (Thailand/Thailand). ld. at BI-4-27, B-11-1-13.
321. See IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at 6. For further analysis of the levels of corporate
complicity, see irifra Part IV-B-1.
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Potential Reach of Primary
Investment & Procurement Measures
i\lcthod of "Primary" Disassociation

15 active firms
8 departed firms

unknown

Apparel
Oil & gas/pipeline const.

8 active firms
17 departed firms

2 firm active firms
4 departed firms

Manufacturing

3 active firms
l departed firm

3 active firms
1 departed firm

Travel services

3 active firms
l departed firm

unknown
2 departed firms

2 active firms
2 departed firms

unknown

Hydropower/const. & equip.
Transportation services/equip.

2 active firms
2 departed firms

unknown
2 departed firms

not known
2 departed firms

not known

Furniture/logging

not known
1 departed firm

not known

Agriculture
Approx. - active firms

23 active firms

6 active firms

34 departed firms

9 departed firms

Approx. total- departed frrms

The inquiry does not end, however, with the fact of corporate
complicity. A company must participate in either a U.S. public procurement market or stock market for procurement or investment policies
to have any real significance for that company. The following chart
indicates the broader reach of investment policies discussed above.
The chart also indicates that both investment and procurement
policies could affect companies that have previously withdrawn from
Burma, but which could choose to return there if the investment
climate changed. Most but not all of the companies that would be
affected by procurement policies would also be affected by investment
policies (some of them are privately held companies).
184

[Vol. 32

LOCAL OPTIONS AFTER CROSBY v. NFTC

A total of approximately fifty-seven companies could be affected by
primary investment policies. Twenty-three of these are active in Burma;
thirty-four are departed. A secondary investment policy could reach a
much larger number of the 329 parent companies that do business in
Burma, approximately 73 of which trade their stock on the New York or
Nasdaq stock exchanges. The political visibility of the narrower policies
is reduced only if there are no meaningful targets, of which there is no
shortage, except perhaps in the logging sector, where consumer boycotts are still active.
With respect to procurement, there are approximately fifteen companies that could be affected in the sectors of petroleum and manufacturing, six of which are active and nine of which have departed.
C.

Building a Constituency for Human Rights

Human rights advocates value public procurement and investment
policies because their adoption and implementation helps to build a
broader constituency for human rights. The policies make local and
concrete that which is otherwise global and abstract-they help build a
national constituency. Campaigns to adopt and implement public
procurement and investment standards achieve the following goals:
• Educating the public. By a large margin, the U.S. public favors
liberalization of trade, 322 but at the same time, they favor a valuebased approach to trade that includes standards for protecting the
environment and human rights. 323 Specifically, seventy-seven percent of Americans favor economic measures to limit trade with
Burma. 324 Much of the public's education about human rights in
Burma has been generated by the debate over policies at the state
and local level.
• Engaging consumers. Public standards have inspired purchasing and
investment decisions by U.S. consumers since 1763. 325 As Professor
Amar has observed,· procurement advances public values not as

322. See, e.g., PROGRAM ON INT'L POUCY AnnuDES, AMERICANS ON GLOBALIZATION: A STUDY OF
U.S. Pusuc ATITIUDES (Mar. 28, 2000), at http:/ /www.pipa.org/onlinereports/globalization/
contents.html.
323. ld. § 1D, Trade Sanctions.
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Brief of Massachusetts at 29-30, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120
S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474); CHARLES MCLEAN ANDREWS, THE BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE
NON-IMPORTATION MOVEMENT 17,33-34,40-41,43,55 (1968);James G. Pope, Republican Moments:
The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 129 PA. L. REv. 287, 330-335
(1990); Porterfield, supra note 7, at 28 n.l82.
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regulation, but as part of commerce itself. 326 Procurement policies
can provide leadership by example for non-government institutions, and vice-vcrsa. 327 For example, when the first college towns
were joining the Burma Boycott in 199&-1997, thousands of students were engaged in the successful boycott that led Pepsi to
withdraw from direct sales in Burma. 328 Consumer boycotts speak
loudly to companies in retail sectors, and as the Burma campaign
illustrates, consumer boycotts can be a catalyst for public-sector
boycotts in "heavier" sectors such as investment banking and
construction. 329
• Engaging investors. & of 1999, the U.S. citizens shifted over onetenth of their investment assets (2.16 trillion dollars out of a total of
16.3 trillion dollars) to "socially responsible" investment funds that
avoid companies with adverse human rights or environmental
records. 330 Among the institutional investors to divest from companies doing business in Burma are the University of Wisconsin, 331
the University of Minnesota332 and Kommunemes Pensionsforsikring, the leading Danish pension fund, both of which sold their
stock in Total, S.A. 333
The prospect of recruiting public pension funds to divest their
holdings in the most morally challenged corporations is significant
for at least three reasons. First, a divestment decision by such a large
shareholder makes news. Second, a divestment decision by a pension
fund or a mutual fund can add value to a corporation's "good will"
assets in the investment community. Third, the globalization of

326. Amar, supra note 9.
327. See, e.g., Free Burma Coalition, American University Statement of Principles on Burma (july
25, 1997), at http:/ /www.freeburmacoalition.org/ old/au-resolution.html.
. 328. FREE BURMA CoALITION, THE FREE BuRMA CoAIJTION MANuAL 3643 (1997) [hereinafter
FBC MANuAL] .Jeff Faux, executive director of the Economic Policy Institute, recently stated:
The times may be ripe for more consumer boycotts. We have more of a consumer
culture, and people see themselves more as consumers today. While people are
participating less in the political process, as consumers they see that one way they can
exercise political power is by where they spend their money and where they don't.
Greenhouse, supra note 290.
329. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 33-34.
330. See Social Investment Forum, SociaUy Responsible Investing in U.S. Tops Two TriUion Dollar
Mark (Nov. 4, 1999), at http:/ /www.socialinvest.org/areas/news/1999-trends.htm.
331. IRRC REPoRT 1998, supra note 19, at app. G, 6 (showing the sale ofTexaco stock).
332. Id. at v-vi and app G, 6 (showing the sale of Total stock).
333. I d. at app. G, 3.
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investment portfolios and corporate subsidiary structures means that
divestment decisions can focus public attention on corporations
based in Europe, Japan and elsewhere.
In November 2000, the nation's largest public pension fund, the
California Public Employees Retirement Fund, announced what
could be a breakthrough in pension fund leadership. In the words of
Phil Angelides, the California State Treasurer, the new policy "recognizes the correlation between political stability and human rights
and the long-term stability and profitability of our investments." 334
The elements of this policy include shifting to active management of
investments in emerging markets (rather than broadly inclusive
index funds) and screening those investments for compliance with
the Global Sullivan Principles, which include human rights, environmental and labor standards. 335
One of the most innovative investment/ divestment campaigns is now
targeting the few oil companies that have invested in Southern
Sudan. The principal target to date has been Talisman Energy of
Toronto. Professor Eric Reeves of Smith College, a leader of this
campaign, estimates that the campaign has effectively frozen the
capital value of Talisman stock when it would have otherwise risen
over 20% percent on the strength of 400% profit gains and a highly
favorable price/earnings ratio. 336 On the strength of this result,
Professor Reeves argues that when divestment campaigns are targeted at individual companies with the worst human rights records,
divestment can create significant economic leverage. Thus, targeted
divestment can have a greater impact than the symbolic statement
that is made by divesting from many companies just because they do
business in a repressive country. 337
In addition to seeking to constrain the capital value of a company,
the Sudan campaign has also employed a number of equity-related
policy initiatives, which could be models for use in other situations.
These include:
• Disclosure of risk. Sudan advocates have petitioned the SEC to
investigate whether oil companies have misled investors by failing

334. Robert Collier, Pension Fund Tightens Foreign Stock Rules, CalPERS Board Gives Weight to
Human Rights, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14,2000, at AS.
335. Id.
336. Letters from Prof. Eric Reeves to the author and Robert Dennis (Nov. 3 & 8, 2000) (on
file with author).
337. ld.
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to disclose their Sudan investment in the company's prospectus for
an initial public offering ("IPO"). A recent target has been the
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation ("Sinopec") .338 Previous Sudan-related advocacy- aimed at the IPO PetroChina, Ltd., a
subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corporation-is credited with limiting the firm to half of the capital it expected to raise
from its IP0. 339
• Capital sanctions. In October 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a provision within the Sudan Peace Act that, if
enacted, would effectively de-list from the New York Stock
Exchange companies that do business with the government of
Sudan. The bill would limit "the sale of stocks in the United
States or to any U.S. person ... in support of a ... project in or
within Sudan." 340 Supporters of the bill favor this approach
because it can target only companies at fault and minimize
collateral damage to other companies that would result from
broader sanctions. 341
Shareholder resolutions can serve the same visibility goals as
divestment campaigns, but they go a step further. For example,
shareholder resolutions have sought disclosure of company operations in Burma (Unocal 1994), as well as outright withdrawal
(Texaco 1996). 342 Other resolutions have sought more generic
human rights policies such as sourcing guidelines (Atlantic Richfield, Caterpillar, and Mobil) that would apply to operations in
Burma. 343 Mter opposing such shareholder resolutions, a number
of companies including Texaco and Atlantic Richfield later withdrew from Burma. 344

338. Letter from Elliott Abrams, Chairman, U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom, to David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Oct. 20, 2000) (on file with author).
339. Peter Wonacolt, Chinese Oil Firm Cut Sudan Links Before /PO, WALL ST.]., Oct. 11, 2000, at
A23.
340. 146 Cong. Rec. Hl0,641 (dailyed. Oct. 24, 2000).
341. Edward Allen, U.S. Legislators Want Markets to Sway Sudan, FIN. TIMES (LoNDON), Nov. 2,
2000, at § 6; Steven Edwards, U.S. BiU May Hit Calgary s Talisman, NAT't. PoST, Nov. 8, 2000, at C6.
342. Id. at v-vi (sale of Total stock). Some Burma-specific resolutions have never been
presented to shareholders because the company invoked the SEC shareholder proposal rule,
which allows companies to omit proposals that affect less than five percent of a company's net
assets and gross sales and are not otherwise significantly related to those activities. Id. at app. G, 3.
343. !d. at app. G, 4.
344. !d. at app. C; OS! Cmporate List, supra note 255.
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During both the anti-Apartheid campaign and the free-Burma
campaign, there has been a synergy between divestment and
shareholder initiatives. When pressured to divest, many universities chose the less complicated option of supporting shareholder
resolutions. 345 Shareholder initiatives have longer staying power
and the potential to influence company behavior as compared to
a divestment campaign. A successful divestment campaign removes an institutional investor from the public debate over that
corporation's conduct. On the other hand, the divestment decisions of a few leading institutions can spur other much larger
institutional investors to either divest or vote in favor of shareholder resolutions. 346 At some universities, students have pursued
both divestment and shareholder initiatives simultaneously in
order to take advantage of the synergy between the two. 347
• Engaging significant political actors. Human rights advocates who
seek to build a public constituency to oppose repression in places
like Burma, Tibet or East Timor have few political resources to
draw on in terms of U.S. citizens whose families .descend from
those foreign cultures. Their hope is that their human rights cause
will be seen as universal and reflect the priorities of significant
domestic constituencies. For example, the AFL-CIO has acted
against the repression of labor rights and use of forced labor in
Burma. John Sweeney, the AFL-CIO president, has called for local
labor councils and state federations to ask state and local governments to "ban procurement of goods produced in conditions that
violate fundamental workers rights." 348 Human rights advocates
cannot be dismissed as marginal if they can effectively reach and
affect the AFL-CIO.
• Creating a laboratory for national policy. The First Circuit acknowledged that "it may be that the Massachusetts law was a catalyst for
federal sanctions." 349 So it was that the state and local laws demon-

345. FBC MANUAL, supra note 328, at 48-51; Simon Billenness, supra note 175.
346. Simon Billenness, supra note 175.
347. /d.; FBC MANuAL, supra note 328, at 48-49.
348. John Sweeney, President of the AFlrCIO, Making the Global Economy Work for
Working Families: Beyond the WTO, Address Before the National Press Club (Nov. 19, 1999), at
http:/ /www.aflcio.org/publ/speech11999/sp1119.htm.
349. Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d 38,77 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The passage
of the Massachusetts Burma Law has resulted in significant attention being brought to the
Burmese government's human rights record. Indeed, it may be that the Massachusetts law was a
catalyst for federal sanctions. Massachusetts also played a role, through its representatives in the
House and the Senate, in Congress's decision to impose sanctions on Burma.").
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strated broad public support before Congress first passed and then
overrode President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act in 1986. 350 The engagement of geographically diverse
state and local governments can establish the political viability of a
policy that is otherwise certain to face business opposition. 351

D.

Influencing Foreign Affairs

State and local procurement and divestment laws during the antiApartheid boycott are credited with having a significant impact on both
the political climate and investment banks, which proved to be the
Achilles heel of the Pretoria government. 352 Burma may be an economic "basket case," but it has no particular vulnerability such as South
Mrica's reliance on international financial investment networks.
However, Burma has demonstrated that it cannot build large-scale
revenue-generating projects without foreign investment and developmental services. If procurement and investment policies can dampen
foreign direct investment, they can stunt the economic staying power of
the junta. In addition to the modest economic constraints that procurement and investment policies could present to the military government, they may also serve to restrain that government's claim of
political legitimacy. Conversely, the prospect of free-flowing investment and trade in a democratic Burma could be a powerful carrot, just
as its withholding works as a stick.
The point of reviewing this political context is that when considering
"what works," human rights advocates evaluate investment and purchasing options from a very different perspective than the corporations that
challenge them. The NFTC condemns procurement and investment
policies as "sanctions" that fail to accomplish the goal of forcing
dictators out of office. However, from a human rights perspective,
these economic measures have a different purpose and value. As
standards for doing business with public funds, their first function is to
disassociate state and local governments from corporate behavior that

350. Pub. L. 99-440, 100 Stat 1086 (Oct. 2, 1986); see Rodman, supra note 14, at 22.
351. For example, long after the end of the anti-Apartheid campaign, The Africa Fund
continues to nurture and engage the network of state and local officials who have a political,
cultural or economic interest in Africa. Recently, The Mrica Fund announced that 14 state and
local officials were calling for debt-relief for impoverished Mrican nations, referring to the debts
to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as the "chains of slavery in the 21st
Century." Press Release, The Africa Fund, State and Municipal Officials Call for Cancellation of
Mrica's Debt (Sept. 20, 2000) (on file with author).
352. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 23-26.
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knowingly supports violation of human rights, either indirectly or
indirectly. By setting a visible public standard, they make it much easier
for advocates to target corporate complicity in violation of human
rights.
V.

CoNCLUSION

Conventional wisdom now holds that globalization limits the capacity of sovereign nations to project their values through regulation
of economic transactions, particularly when a regulation has an extraterritorial effect. However, globalization also brings economic interdependence, which begets greater political inter-connection. Both
governments and individual citizens can more readily see and feel the
consequences of each other's economic behavior. 353
When the first human rights agreements were negotiated decades
ago, the relative isolation of national economies made it easy for
countries to sign on, even those that violated human rights. There
were, after all, no foreseeable consequences for those who benefited
from violation of the agreements. But now, consumers and investors
can learn which companies benefit from violation of human rights. As
consumers and investors, rather than regulators, governments actually
enjoy greater power, not less, because of globalization.
The Supreme Court's decision to strike down Massachusetts' Burma
law has implications beyond Burma. In the future, a congressional
response to foreign governments that systemically repress human
rights is likely to repeat the elements of federal sanctions against South
Mrica and Burma. However, these "delicately balanced" sanctions are
not designed to have a real economic impact. They merely convey a
symbolic statement that will not upset corporate interests.
The post-Crosby options for market participation have a dramatically
narrower purpose and effect than a secondary boycott. These options
for procurement, disclosure, divestment, shareholder resolutions, and
political speech are summarized in the chart and options menu in the
annex following this conclusion. Because their impact on foreign

353. This realization arose in oral arguments on the Massachusetts Burma law when one of
the justices asked Thomas Barnico, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, why state
governments had not participated in economic boycotts between American revolution and the
anti-Apartheid campaign. Mr. Bamico replied that it "has to do with the fact that there was very
limited global trade for those years. There.was limited information available to state governments
about other activities in foreign states. Oral Argument Transcript at 11, Crosb-y (No. 99-474).
ft
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governments is indirect and incidental, they should escape the reach of
federal preemption
Is such an incidental impact worth the effort? The answer is "yes" to
the extent that the post-Cros{Jy options still fulfill the functions of
economic advocacy. They establish market participation standards
based on human rights; they target violations of human rights; they
build a constituency for human rights; and they enable that constituency to call on the federal government for more direct foreign affairs
action to promote human rights.
As market participants, state and local governments dwarf the federal
presence. At $730 billion, state and local procurement accounts for
three quarters of public-sector purchasing in the United States. Public
pension funds stand among the leading institutional investors. Their
purchasing power, their visibility as investors, and their public accountability make state and local governments a prime constituency for
human rights in the global economy. The Supreme Court cannot alter
that fact; nor has it accepted the corporate invitation to commandeer
every aspect of market participation from the federal bench. Rather,
the Court left room for another round of policy innovation at the state
and local level.
For state and local governmentS that see the moral consequences of
their market participation, the logical course is to use the same powers
that private market participants enjoy unless Congress or the Supreme
Court says otherwise. The post-Crosby options are the middle ground
between using "coercive" boycotts and merely writing letters to Congress. For the sake of a humane global economy, one that is shaped
more by market participation than government regulation, it is ground
well worth claiming and defending.
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LOCAL OPTIONS TO REPLACE BURMA BOYCOTT LAWS
Summary of Options & Risk of Preemption
Each option in the chart is defined in the menu that follows.

A.

B.
1

H

2
3

H
H

6
7

M
M

8

M

A.

B.

9

Ill.

M

Secondary Boycott - Option is preempted; the alternatives are to:
1.
Suspend.the existing law.
a.
Suspend indefinitely.
Suspend 3 years, then repeal.
b.
2.
the
law
Primary Boycott
1.
Goods made in Burma - Option is not available; high risk of
preemption.
2.
Companies connected to human rights violations.
a.
General sector of violations.
1.
Avoid all business from that sector.
2.
Avoid a product or service from that sector.
b.
SpecifiC project or product with human rights violations.
1.
Avoid all business with that company.
Avoid
of that can1oar1v.
General Sector with Human Rights VlolaUons. Triggared by:
1.
General - any procurementfrom company in sector.
2.
within an affected sector.
Specific Project with Human Rights VIolations. Triggered by:
1.
General - any procurement from company that makes/sells the
product.
2.
Specific - procurement of that specific product.

Divestment
A.
Indirect Connection. Sell stock of a company that

10

L

11

L ~--~2.~~~~==~~~~~~~~~~~------------i

12

L
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Menu of Options to Replace Burma Boycott Laws
I. Procurement
A. Secondary Boycott

This is the option that the Supreme Court preempted in Crosby v. NFTC.
Like the Massachusetts Burma law that was struck down by the
Court, these laws require that state or local agencies avoid
purchasing goods or services from companies that either do
business in Burma or, more directly, do business with the
government of Burma. In order to comply with the Court's
decision, the options are to:
1. Suspend the existing law until such time as Congress may
remove the preemption of the law under federal Burma
sanctions.
a. Suspend indefinitely.
b. Suspend for a period of three years, after which time the
law is repealed.
2. &peal the existing law.
B. Primary Boycott
1. Goods made in Burma. This option is not available as it carries a
high risk ofpreemption.
2. Companies connected to human rights violations. Avoid doing business with companies that are themselves connected
to violation of human rights.
a. General sector. Do not purchase goods made in sectors
where violation of human rights is often part of the
production or development process.
(1) Avoid aU business. Do not purchase any goods or
services from such a company.
(2) Avoid product or seroice from that sector. Do not purchase
from such a company the particular product or service from the economic sector that benefits from
violation of human rights.
b. Specific product or project. Do not purchase from companies
that benefit from a production or development process
that violates human rights.
(1) Avoid aU business. Do not purchase any goods or
services from such a company.
.
(2) Avoid specific product or seroice. Do not purchase from
such a company the particular product or service that
benefits from violation of human rights.
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II. Disclosure as an Alternative to a Primary Boycott
& an alternative to a primary boycott, do not impose any limit on

eligibility to bid for procurement contracts except the following:
Before a contract can be awarded, certain companies must first
disclose the nature of their business in Burma and whether or not
it is connected with violation of human rights. Once a company
discloses the information, the state or local government must sign
the contract. The scope could be sector-specific or companyspecific as follows:
A. General Sector
Require disclosure by companies that invest or trade within a
general sector that benefits from violation of human rights or
where violation of human rights is often part of the production
or development process. Disclosure would be triggered by:
1. General. Any procurement from a company that invests or
trades in such a sector.
2. Sector-specific. Procurement only in the same sector that benefits from violation of human rights.
B. Specific Project
Require disclosure by companies that directly participate in or
benefit from a project or product that has been developed or
produced with violation of human rights. Disclosure would be
triggered by:
1. General. Any procurement from a company that makes or
sells the product.
2. Sector-specific. Procurement only of that specific product.
Ill. Divestment
A. Indirect Connection
Sell the stock of companies that:
1. Do business in Burma.
2. Do business with the military government of Burma.
B. Direct Connection
Sell the stock of companies that benefit from violation of
human rights:
1. General sector. Because that company trades in a sector where
violation of human rights is often part of the production or
development process. Examples:
a. Oil and gas pipeline construction and operation.
b. Hydroelectric dam construction and operation.
2000]
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c. Logging of tropical hardwoods.
d. Shrimp farming.
2. Specific product or project. Because that company participates in
a project or specific product that has been developed or
produced with violation ofhuman rights.
IV. Shareholder Resolutions
Require [or authorize] the managers of public pension funds to
vote [and cosponsor] shareholder resolutions that require the
company to:
A. Adopt human rights standards, for purposes of avoiding business
relationships in countries where all commerce indirectly supports repression of human rights or with particular partners,
contractors or suppliers that benefit from violation of human
rights or participate in projects or products that were developed
or produced with violation of human rights.
B. Evaluate business in Burma, which weighs the benefits against the
costs of risking consumer boycotts, lobbying expenses to oppose federal, state or local policies on doing business in Burma,
and damage to the company's reputation and good will.
C. Evaluate executive leadership, which raises the company's business
in Burma in the context of executive compensation and evaluation of mangers' performance.
V. Political Speech
A. Publication of the names of companies doing business in Burma,
with which the state or local government must now do business.
B. Adoption of a legislative resolution that condemns human rights
violations by the government of Burma and the complicity of
corporations that support the military government.
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